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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
"My city was desirous of suing the county for violating the city's zoning
As City Attorney, I was requested to research the
ordinance ....
After
matter and give an opinion to the Mayor and Council ....
giving my opinion that a suit against the county would be contrary to
law and might subject the city (and its lawyer) to attorney's fees, the
[Mlayor and [Clouncil voted unanimously to sue the county. The local
newspaper's headlines read, 'City Votes Unanimously To Sue County
Against Advice of City Attorney!' One of the Council members was
quoted as saying, 'regardless of the law, we have an obligation to
sue.'"'

In local government law, the "obligation to sue" continues apace.
I.
A.

MUNICIPALITIES

Annexation

The municipality's annexation of unincorporated territory stands as a
subject of sharp disagreement between Georgia cities and counties.2
Illustratively, on two litigated occasions during this survey period, a
county employed statutory prerequisites to sidetrack municipal

* Carter Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Georgia School of Law (A.B., 1956;
L.L.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. An account from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw: LITE 21-22
(1997). For a more serious "profile" of Georgia local government law, those who practice
it, and the practice itself, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE
PRACTICE OF GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1996). See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,

Georgia Local Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1
(1994).
2. Both city attorneys and county attorneys rate the single most divisive issue between
municipal and county governments to be that of annexation. R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A
PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 126 (1994).
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4
3
City of Buford v. Gwinnett County
effectuation of the process.
featured an ordinance purporting to annex territory separated from the
city boundary by three parcels of land: one owned by the county, one
containing a state right-of-way, and one owned by a utility.5 Addressing
the county's challenge of non-contiguity, the Georgia Court of Appeals
interpreted the material statute.' There was no problem, the court
decided, in "stacking" more than one intervening parcel between the
boundary and the annexed territory, so long as each parcel was
statutorily exempted from the contiguity requirement.7 Although both
the county parcel and the state right-of-way parcel enjoyed express
exemption, 8 the court concluded the parcel owned by the utility did
not.9 That intervening parcel rendered the proposed annexed territory
non-contiguous to the municipality, thereby voiding the procedure.10

3. For perspective on Georgia annexation law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Law of
Municipal Annexation in Georgia: Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV. 35 (1967); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia:Nay-Sayers Beware, 5 GA. L. REv. 499
(1971); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia:The Contiguity Conundrum,
9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalDe-Annexation: The Ins and the
Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118 (1991).
4. 262 Ga. App. 248, 585 S.E.2d 122 (2003).
5. Id. at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 123. The landowner had petitioned for annexation seeking
to avoid a county rezoning moratorium. Id.
6. Id. at 248-59, 585 S.E.2d at 123. O.C.G.A. section 36-36-21 (2000) defines
"contiguous area" as one directly abutting the municipal boundary or one separated from
the boundary by
lands owned by the municipal corporation, by lands owned by a county, or by
lands owned by this state or by the definite width of (1) any street or street right
of way, (2) any creek or river, or (3) any right of way of a railroad or other public
service corporation.
O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21.
7. City of Buford, 262 Ga. App. at 251, 585 S.E.2d at 124. The court thus reversed the
trial judge's decision that the municipality could not annex property separated by more
than one exempted parcel of land. Id.
8. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21.
9. City of Buford, 262 Ga. App. at 251, 585 S.E.2d at 125. "The real estate owned in
fee simple by Georgia Power, however, does not fall within any of the exceptions described
in [the statute]." Id. With its deed,
Georgia Power would be able to sell the land outright to someone else, which
would result in the annexed property being separated from the city boundary
property by a parcel of land that does not fall within any of the excepted
categories ....
The property would thus become an isolated municipal island, a
result the General Assembly surely did not intend.
Id. at 252, 585 S.E.2d at 125.
10. Id. at 252, 585 S.E.2d at 125. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's
conclusion that the attempted annexation was void. Id.
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The municipality found itself hoist on another statutory petard in City
of Riverdale v. Clayton County," the county's challenge to a sixty
percent annexation procedure. 2 First, the court could find no evidence
that the city had determined the proposed annexation to be in the best
interest of its citizens and those in the annexed area.'" Under the
material statute, 4 "the best interest determination [must] be made
prior to annexation." 5 Second, the court likewise upheld the trial
judge's decision that "the city failed to make adequate plans to extend
services to the annexed area." 6 There were only "brief written
statements from three city department heads" v that existing city
services could accommodate the annexed area.'" Such "conclusory
statements," the court declared, fell far short of the requisite "detailed
plans and reports for the extension of services.""9 Once again, therefore, the city's annexation effort failed.
Officers and Employees
Municipal officers and employees pursued and defended claims
sounding in a variety of contexts and touching a range of substantive
concerns. The court of appeals considered two workers' compensation
controversies, one seeking to avert the system and the other to elicit its

B.

11. 263 Ga. App. 672, 588 S.E.2d 845 (2003).
12. Id. at 672, 588 S.E.2d at 846. The statute authorizes annexation by ordinance
"upon the written and signed application of not less than [sixty] percent of the electors
resident in the area included in any such application and of the owners of not less than
[sixty] percent of the land area, by acreage, included in such application." O.C.G.A. § 3636-32 (2000).
13. City of Riverdale, 263 Ga. App. at 674, 588 S.E.2d at 847. Although not expressly
required to be made on record, "it certainly behooves any municipal corporation to make
a record of such a mandated determination." Id.
14. O.C.GA. § 36-36-37 (2000).
15. City of Riverdale, 263 Ga. App. at 674, 588 S.E.2d at 847.
16. Id.
Under [O.C.G.A. section] 36-36-35, a municipal corporation must make plans for
the extension of services to the area proposed to be annexed, and at least
[fourteen] days before the public hearing on the proposed annexation it must
prepare and make available to the public a report setting forth those plans.
Id.
17. Id. at 675, 588 S.E.2d at 848.
18. Id. Those statements came from the police chief, the fire chief, and the public
works director. Id.
19. Id. "The trial court correctly found that the purported plans and reports to the
public about how the city will extend services to the area are completely inadequate under
[O.C.G.A. section] 36-36-35." Id.
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benefits.2" In the former, Brooks-Powers v. MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid
Transit Authority,21 the claimant sought to by-pass the system's
exclusivity provision by invoking federal rights.' An unreceptive court
first rejected plaintiff's action under the Urban Mass Transit Act,23
holding that statute provided neither an express nor an implied right of
action. 24 "Had Congress intended to allow transit workers to sue
outside of workers' compensation systems, it could have authorized suit
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act."25 The court likewise
rebuffed plaintiff's claim under "Section 1983, "2' a claim for denying
employee's due process by failing to provide a safe working environment.27 Defendant's conduct, the court reasoned, "did not constitute
to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
deliberate behavior 'intended
28
government interest.'"
The second episode, City of Savannah v. Stevens,29 featured a police
officer's claim of workers' compensation benefits for injuries received
while driving her personal vehicle to work. 0 Preliminarily, the court
emphasized its limited role of review, as well as its deference to the
expertise of the administrative board.3 The court then relied upon

20. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers' Compensation in Georgia
Municipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1980).
21. 260 Ga. App. 390, 579 S.E.2d 802 (2003). Plaintiffs decedent died in an on-the-job
accident.
22. Id. at 391, 579 S.E.2d at 804. "The rights and the remedies granted to an employee
by this chapter shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employees ....
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (2004).
23. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5329, 5330 (2000).
24. Brooks-Powers, 260 Ga. App. at 392, 579 S.E.2d at 805. The court determined that
no provision showed "Congress expressly intended to preempt state workers' compensation
laws and authorize an injured worker or his heirs to file a private right of action in these
circumstances." Id. Likewise, the court surmised that "[almong the five stated purposes
of the UMA, nothing reflects a congressional intent to create a remedy for employees
injured on the job." Id. at 393, 579 S.E.2d at 805.
25. Id. at 394, 579 S.E.2d at 806. "Moreover, the cause of action for a workplace injury
is one traditionally relegated to state law. . . ." Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
27. Brooks-Powers, 260 Ga. App. at 395-96, 579 S.E.2d at 806.
28. Id. at 396,579 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
849 (1998)). "The assertion of a deprivation of substantive due process under these facts
is therefore not sustainable." Id.
29. 261 Ga. App. 694, 583 S.E.2d 553 (2003), overruled by City of Savannah v. Stevens,
278 Ga. 166, 598 S.E.2d 456 (2004). This case is outside the survey period and will,
therefore, be discussed in a subsequent survey.
30. Id. at 694, 583 S.E.2d at 554. Plaintiff had a collision in her personal vehicle while
driving to her precinct that was located one block away. Id.
31. Id. "The Board is presumed to be expert in its field and to have extensive
experience in analyzing the circumstances of employment, the duties of employees, and the
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"uncontradicted testimony" that the officer was "on call, in uniform,

armed, carrying a radio, and on the city streets that her job demanded
that she protect.""2 Consequently, the court affirmed the trial judge's
claimant's injuries "arose out of and
approval of the board's decision that
3
in the course of her employment.",
A police chief's claim of wrongful termination drew the court's
attention in Wilson v. City of Sardis,4 an action for damages against
the municipality.35 Affording short shrift to plaintiff's contentions, the
court rested upon the undisputable fact of his "at-will" employment.3 6
An at-will employee "'may be discharged at any time for any reason or
[for] no reason, with no cause of action for wrongful termination under
state law.'" 37 The court thus affirmed an adverse summary judgment. 8
Sparks v. Peaster39 instanced a municipal citizen's defamation action40
against the city manager for publicizing plaintiff's alleged drug habit.
The court evaluated the claim by emphasizing evidence of plaintiff's
"political activism" and "confrontational tactics."
By voluntarily
involving himself "in numerous issues of public controversy with the
stated intent of influencing their outcome,"42 plaintiff had attained the
status of "a limited purpose public figure. 4 3 So positioned, plaintiff
must make "a clear and convincing" showing that defendant "'in fact

scope of coverage under the applicable statutes. We defer to their opinion on all issues of

fact." Id.
32. Id. at 698, 583 S.E.2d at 556.
33. Id.
34. 264 Ga. App. 178, 590 S.E.2d 383 (2003).
35. Id. at 178, 590 S.E.2d at 384-85. The municipal governing authority had held a
public hearing and subsequently fired plaintiff on grounds that he had allegedly falsified
the status of an applicant to the police academy. Id. at 179, 590 S.E.2d at 385.
36. Id. at 179, 590 S.E.2d at 385.
37. Id. (quoting Duck v. Jacobs, 739 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1990)).
38. Id. The court also rejected plaintiffs claim of tortious interference with business
relations. Id. at 180, 590 S.E.2d at 385.
39. 260 Ga. App. 232, 581 S.E.2d 579 (2003).
40. Id. at 232, 581 S.E.2d at 580. Defendant allegedly made the statement to the editor
of a newspaper. Id. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in Georgia Local
Government Law: A Brief History, 16 GA. L. REV. 599 (1982).
41. Sparks, 260 Ga. App. at 233, 581 S.E.2d at 580. Plaintiff is a "community activist"
and "extremely aggressive." Id. at 233-34, 581 S.E.2d at 580-81.
42. Id. at 236, 581 S.E.2d at 582. The court held plaintiff to meet the "three-pronged
test enunciated in Silvester v. American BroadcastingCo., 839 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir.
1988)." Id. at 235-36, 581 S.E.2d at 582.
43. Id. at 236, 581 S.E.2d at 582.
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entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements.'"" Given
the city manager's safety concerns and the reports supplied him by
police officers, the court deemed plaintiff deficient in meeting the "heavy
burden" of establishing "actual malice."45
Finally, Ward v. City of Cairo4 featured a challenge to the general
statute subjecting a municipal court judge to termination by the city
governing authority.47 Plaintiff alleged the statute to violate separation
of powers' "because it authorizes the city to control the court's day-today activities."4 9 Eschewing sustained analysis of the issue,5" the
Georgia Supreme Court relied upon early authority to cabin the
separation of powers concept.5 1 The constitution's command "'relates
to State legislative, judicial, and executive powers,'"52 the court
delineated, "'and has no relation to municipal offices, created by the
legislature, in the discharge of strictly municipal functions.'" 53 Because
the municipal court "is a municipal office discharging strictly municipal
functions,"54 the termination statute "does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine of the Georgia Constitution."55

44. Id. at 238, 581 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Davis v. Shavers, 225 Ga. App. 497, 500-01,
484 S.E.2d 243 (1997)).

45. Id. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for defendant. Id.
46. 276 Ga. 391, 583 S.E.2d 821 (2003).
47. Id. at 391, 583 S.E.2d at 821-22. O.C.G.A. section 36-32-2(a) (2000) empowers the
municipal governing authority to appoint a judge of the municipal court and provides that
the appointee "shall serve at the pleasure of the governing authority." Id. In this case, the
governing authority terminated the judge's employment when he failed to follow the city's
direction to reinstate a former probation service provider. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 822.
48. Id. at 392, 583 S.E.2d at 823. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3 (providing that
"the legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct
49. Ward, 276 Ga. at 392, 583 S.E.2d at 823.
50. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Delegation in GeorgiaLocal Government
Law, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 9 (1970).
51. Ward, 276 Ga. at 392, 583 S.E.2d at 823. The court relied upon BuildingAuthority
of Fulton County v. State of Georgia, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984), which in turn
relied upon Ford v. Mayor & Council of Brunswick, 134 Ga. 820, 68 S.E. 733 (1910). Id.
52. Id. (quoting Ford v. Mayor & Council of Brunswick, 134 Ga. 820, 821, 68 S.E. 733,
733 (1910)).
53. Id. at 392-93, 583 S.E.2d at 823.
54. Id. at 393, 583 S.E.2d at 823.
55. Id. On this same basis, the court also rejected plaintiffs attack against O.C.G.A.
section 42-8-100(g)(1), requiring the municipal court judge to present for approval by the
governing authority any contract with private corporations for probation services. Id. at
394, 583 S.E.2d at 824.
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Regulation

In the attempted governance of activities and events occurring within
its boundaries, the municipality may well encounter opposition from
those impacted by its efforts.56 The survey period was not atypical,
therefore, in presenting instances of opposition. Two such instances
turned more immediately upon the relationship between local and state
legislation, a matter of legendary judicial concern.57 The appellate
courts have struggled over the centuries in crafting and applying various
"tests" for resolving the stand-off arising when general and local statutes
deal with the same subject." Serving as the present terminus for that
struggle, in 1998 the supreme court jettisoned its former test of "genuine
conflict" and embraced an approach of "implied preemption."5 9 Via that
approach, it appeared the court afforded itself the most discretion
possible to deal harshly with local statutes. 0 Both appellate courts
employed that discretion during the period under scrutiny.
City of Buford v. Georgia Power Co.6 concerned the validity of a
municipal ordinance establishing a one-year moratorium on constructing
electric power substations within 500 feet of residentially zoned
property. 2 Granting the power company's request to enjoin enforcement, the supreme court relied upon a general statute's "express
preemption of local ordinances 'expanding the power of regulation over
any business activity regulated by the Public Service Commission beyond

56. For treatment of municipal regulatory power in an assortment of contexts, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., "AscertainableStandards" versus "Unbridled Discretion" in Local
Government Regulation, 41 GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Discretion in Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Law and Liquor Licensing:A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local
Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
57. The governing constitutional provision, in place for more than one hundred years,
is GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4: "No local or special law shall be enacted in any case for
which provision has been made by an existing general law."
58. For treatment of that struggle, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., When is a Special Law
Unlawfully Special?, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1167 (1976); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Unlawful
Special Laws: A Postscripton the Proscription,30 MERCER L. REV. 319 (1978).
59. Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 507 S.E.2d 460 (1998).
60. Id. at 275, 507 S.E.2d at 462-63. For discussion, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The
Georgia Supreme Court and Local Government Law: Two Sheets to the Wind, 16 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 361 (1999).
61. 276 Ga. 590, 581 S.E.2d 16 (2003).
62. Id. at 590, 581 S.E.2d at 17. Under the ordinance, the municipality issued a stop
work order regarding Georgia Power's construction of a substation and the power company
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. Id.
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that authorized by charter or general law or by the Constitution.'"13 It
was immaterial, the court reasoned, that the Public Service Commission
("PSC") had no rules governing the placement of substations: "[Pireemption is a matter of legislative intent, it does not depend on whether
the PSC has exercised the power it has been given ......" Here the
"legislative intent" derived from the "breadth and scope" of the general
statute was clearly to preempt the city ordinance. 5
The court of appeals preemption exercise appeared in Hill v. Tschannen,N a tenant's civil action against a landlord for failure to comply
with a municipal ordinance requiring "smoke detectors that are
continuously powered from the building's electrical system."67 Defendant countered with evidence of his compliance with a general statute
requiring "an approved battery operated smoke detector."6' Holding
that "the local law is preempted by the state law,"69 the court relied
upon the conflict otherwise presented: "Under the ...ordinance, a staterequired, battery-operated detector would be insufficient. Accordingly,
operation of the state law rather than
the ordinance would hinder
70
augment or strengthen it."
The regulatory system litigated in State v. Heretic, Inc.7' resulted
from a combination of state and municipal legislative measures.
Although prohibiting Sunday alcohol sales by the drink,72 the state
statute expressly authorized local governments to exempt restaurants
from the ban.78 Upon the municipal exercise of that option, plaintiff
bar owner brought an equal protection challenge to the system's

63. Id. The general statute was O.C.G.A. section 36-35-6(a)(5) (2000).
64. Id. at 591, 581 S.E.2d at 17-18.
65. Id. at 590, 581 S.E.2d at 18. The court rejected the municipality's argument that
both its charter and general statutes conferred the regulatory power upon it. Id. at 590-91,
581 S.E.2d at 17. The authority granted by those provisions, the court delineated, "is
limited to a utility's use of City property," and "Georgia Power is not using City property.
It is constructing the substation on its own property." Id.
66. 264 Ga. App. 288, 590 S.E.2d 133 (2003).
67. Id. at 290, 590 S.E.2d at 135. Plaintiff had suffered burns while staying in
defendant's apartment complex. Id. at 288, 590 S.E.2d at 133.
68. Id. at 291, 590 S.E.2d at 135; O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40(a)(2) (2003). "The evidence is
undisputed that [defendant] had complied with [the general statute]: the apartment
building had battery-operated smoke detectors installed on the wall going to the bedrooms."
Hill, 264 Ga. App. at 291, 590 S.E.2d at 135.
69. Hill, 264 Ga. App. at 291, 590 S.E.2d at 135.
70. Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant. Id. at 292,
590 S.E.2d at 136.
71. 277 Ga. 275, 588 S.E.2d 224 (2003).
72. O.C.G.A. § 3-3-20(a) (2000).
73. O.C.G.A. § 3-3-7 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
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distinction between bars and restaurants.14 Rejecting the attack, the
supreme court found a "rational basis"75 for the distinction: "The
legislature could have reasonably concluded that restaurants should be
excluded from the general ban on Sunday alcohol sales because doing so
would attract families and others to go out for meals on Sunday, thereby
contributing to the legislative goal of enhancing the recreational
atmosphere of that day."76
D.

Contracts
Municipal contracting capabilities came before the appellate courts in
two distinctly different contexts during the survey period. Macon Water
Authority v. City of Forsythv7 featured a water authority's contract to
purchase electricity from the municipality, the parties further agreeing
that a flood would abate but not terminate the contract, requiring
mandatory arbitration in the event of default. When, in less than one
year, a catastrophic flood did occur, the authority defaulted on the
agreement, moved to another site, and entered into a new contract with
a different electric supplier.7 s At the municipality's request, the trial
court ordered arbitration, and the water authority appealed that order
to the court of appeals. 79 That court reviewed the contract and held the
water authority in default for failing to submit the issue of flood
termination to arbitration. 0 The court likewise rejected the authority's
contention of municipal waiver by the city's action before the Public

74. Heretic, 277 Ga. at 275, 588 S.E.2d at 225. "Pursuant to [the statute], the City...
authorizes the Sunday sale of alcohol at an 'eating establishment.'" Id.
75. Id. "Under this ['rational basis'] test, the statute[s] will be upheld if any state of
facts can reasonably be conceived to support the legislature's exception of the listed
businesses, but not bars, from the general ban." Id. at 275-76, 588 S.E.2d at 225.
76. Id. at 276, 588 S.E.2d at 225-26. Further, the legislature may have made the
distinction on the basis of "health and safety risks." Id. at 277, 588 S.E.2d at 226. The
court thus upheld the regulatory system even conceding that "some restaurants could
operate as bars on Sunday." Id. at 276, 588 S.E.2d at 226.
77. 262 Ga. App. 224, 585 S.E.2d 131 (2003).
78. Id. at 224, 585 S.E.2d at 133. A river flooded the authority's treatment plant,
rendering it inoperable, and causing the authority to build a new treatment plant at
another location. Id. at 225, 585 S.E.2d at 133.
79. Id. at 225, 585 S.E.2d at 133. "This is an appeal from the trial court's order
compelling arbitration under the contract to supply electricity...." Id. at 224, 585 S.E.2d
at 132.
80. Id. at 225, 585 S.E.2d at 133. "[The authority] entered into a new contract with
[another supplier] to provide electric services. [The authority] treated the contract with the
City ... as terminated by the flood without submitting this to arbitration." Id.
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Service Commission against the other electric supplier.8 1 That proceeding, the court reasoned, had nothing to do with the contract between the
city and the authority and did not constitute waiver.8" Indeed, "The
City... has continuously asserted its legal rights throughout to a valid
binding contract with [the authority]."
The supreme court also dealt with electric power contracts in City of
Cartersville v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia.8" The case
arose under the "intergovernmental contracts clause" of the Georgia
Constitution, which allows municipalities to contract with other public
agencies for a period not exceeding fifty years.88 The municipality and
its electric supplier sought a declaratory judgement on whether the
provision would permit either of two proposed changes to their power
sales contract.87 First, the court approved their proposal of a twentyfive year contract extension, given that the existing contract was for less
than twenty-five years.88 Second, the court approved a proposal to
rescind the present agreement and enter into a new fifty-year contract.89 Because neither proposal would bind the municipality for a
total of more than fifty years, the court reasoned, "both proposals are
acceptable under the intergovernmental contracts clause."90

81. Id. at 226, 585 S.E.2d at 134. In that proceeding, the authority was challenging the
other supplier's power to contract, arguing it to be in violation of the Georgia Territorial
Electric Service Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-3. Id.
82. Id. That proceeding "did not determine either directly or indirectly whether or not
the agreement between the City and [the authority] had terminated by default or other
reasons." Id.
83. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's order of arbitration between the
parties. Id. at 228, 585 S.E.2d at 135.
84. 277 Ga. 575, 592 S.E.2d 677 (2004).
85. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1(a).
86. Id.
87. City of Cartersville,277 Ga. at 575, 592 S.E.2d at 678. The court explained that
under the power sales contract, the authority supplies electrical power to the municipality
on a non-profit basis. Id. The municipality's
payments under the Contract are pledged to secure the payment of revenue bonds
issued yearly by [the authority] to fund infrastructure improvements. Because the
Power Sales Contracts constitute the collateral for the revenue bonds, [authorityissued] bonds must mature before the contracts expire. This limitation results in
severe debt-compression and restricts (the authority's] ability to refinance the
bonds at more favorable interest rates.
Id.
88. Id. at 576, 592 S.E.2d at 678.
89. Id.
90. Id., 592 S.E.2d at 678-79.
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E.

Finances
Board of Public Education v. Hair9' presented an internal local
government controversy over the costs of collecting school taxes.92 The
municipal school board challenged the validity of a county ordinance and
state statute providing the county a 2.5 percent commission for collecting
school taxes. Because the commission exceeded the county's costs of
collection,93 the school board contended, it failed to comply with the
constitution's authorization of county "reimbursement."94 A unanimous
supreme court reviewed the tax collection system and rejected the school
board's contentions.95 The constitution authorizes the general assembly
to set a statewide reimbursement rate, and the legislature set that rate
at 2.5 percent. 96 "A natural consequence," the court reasoned, "is that
2.5 [percent] may over-reimburse some [collection] entities and underreimburse others. When examined on a state-wide basis, however,
nothing in the record suggests that 2.5 [percent] is an unreasonable rate
of reimbursement."9 v Moreover, because the board must rely on county
collection of school taxes, the county's receipt of a statewide reimbursement rate "is a necessary and incidental public education expense,
authorized under the Georgia Constitution."9"

91. 276 Ga. 575, 581 S.E.2d 28 (2003).
92. Id. at 575, 581 S.E.2d at 28. The county tax collector collects the taxes and pays
the 2.5 percent commission over to the county. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-404(a) (1999 & Supp.
2004).
93. "Under the new rate, the Board pays approximately 111 [percent] of the County's
cost to collect all the taxes." Hair,276 Ga. at 575, 581 S.E.2d at 30.
94. Id. "Article VIII, section VI, paragraph 3 of the Georgia Constitution authorizes
the General Assembly to pass a general law that 'requires local boards of education to
reimburse the appropriate governing authority for the collection of school taxes, provided
that any rate established may be reduced by local act.'" Id.
95. Id. at 578, 581 S.E.2d at 31-32.
96. Id. at 575, 581 S.E.2d at 30.
97. Id. at 576, 581 S.E.2d at 30. "Because [O.C.G.A. section] 48-5-404(a) does not limit
the County's commission to the cost to collect the school taxes, the county ordinance that
authorizes the County to receive 2.5 [percent] does not violate the state statute." Id. at
576-77, 581 S.E.2d at 31.
98. Id. at 577, 581 S.E.2d at 31. Thus, the rate did not violate GA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 6, para. 1(b): "School tax funds shall be expended only for the support and maintenance
of public schools ... public education, and activities necessary or incidental thereto." Hair,
276 Ga. at 578, 581 S.E.2d at 32. The court upheld the trial court's decision sustaining the
validity of both ordinance and statute. Id.
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Liability
Municipal tort immunity is, of course, a fixture in local government
law,99 and its typical operation found appropriate illustration in the
survey period case of Reese v. City of Atlanta.1°° There, plaintiff sued
the municipality, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution for
having been charged by a police officer with criminal trespass.'0 '
Relying exclusively upon the doctrine of "governmental immunity," °2
the court of appeals effected prompt disposition of the action: "There
being no evidence that the City waived its immunity by the purchase of
insurance, the City was entitled to summary judgement on all the
claims." °3
The supreme court treated the facets of both immunity and waiver
more broadly in CSX Transportation,Inc. v. City of Garden City,' an
answer to questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.'
Primarily, the court held that a municipality possesses no
power to waive its sovereign immunity by entering into an indemnification agreement with a third party.I" Accordingly, the court invalidat99. For perspective, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT
IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government: The
"Crisis" Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993). See also
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government LiabilityLitigation:NumericalNuances, 38 GA. L.
REV. 633 (2004).
100. 261 Ga. App. 761, 583 S.E.2d 584 (2003).
101. Id. at 761, 583 S.E.2d at 584. Plaintiff had resisted the officer's effort to
investigate a charge of scalping tickets and refused to leave the premises, resulting in the
officer charging him with criminal trespass. The charges were later dismissed when the
officer failed to appear in court. Id.
102. Id. at 762, 583 S.E.2d at 584-85. "The doctrine of governmental immunity also
protected the City... from liability for the actions of its employees, including [the police
officer]." Id.
103. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 585. As for personal liability, the court employed the principle
of official immunity, which protected the officer from responsibility for his discretionary
acts in the absence of malice or intent to injure. Id. at 761-62, 583 S.E.2d at 585. For
perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Officers: Rights for Their
Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia
Local Government Law: The HauntingHiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993).
104. 277 Ga. 248, 588 S.E.2d 688 (2003).
105. Id. at 248, 588 S.E.2d at 688.
106. Id. at 251, 588 S.E.2d at 690. The railroad sought indemnification from the city
when a passenger train collided with a truck operated by the city's subcontractor resulting
in the railroad's property damage and subjecting it to third-party claims. Id. at 248, 588
S.E.2d at 688.
LIABILITY
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ed the city's contract to indemnify the railroad for liabilities suffered
while the city installed water and sewer lines on the railroad right-ofway.' °7 "[Tihe indemnification agreement between the City and CSX is
void as an ultra vires contract.""0 8 Only if the municipality purchased
liability insurance, the court concluded, could it waive its immunity to
the extent of liability coverage. 109
In two cases of the period, the court of appeals considered the
immunity exception effected by the municipal creation or maintenance
of a nuisance." 0 The homeowner's complaint in Cundy v. City of
Smyrna.' rested upon allegations of backed-up sewers-the first in
October 1999 and the other in March 2001. Plaintiff gave the city no
written notice of her claims until May 2001, maintaining that the two
incidents constituted a continuing nuisance." 2 Rejecting plaintiff's
position, the court held the ante litem notice statute"' barred any
107. Id. at 251, 588 S.E.2d at 690.
108. Id. at 250, 588 S.E.2d at 690. The court asserted that "nothing in [O.C.G.A.
section] 36-36-1 can be construed to permit a municipality to waive its sovereign immunity
by contracting to indemnify a third party." Id.
109. Id. at 251, 588 S.E.2d at 690. Plaintiff contended that the city participated in the
available group insurance program ("GIRMA" as provided by O.C.G.A. §§ 36-85-1 to -20),
and the court indicated the potential of that argument, aside from the indemnity contract:
"Thus, if the facts behind CSX's cause of action against the City fall within the scope of
coverage provided by the GIRMA policy and sovereign immunity would otherwise apply to
that cause of action, the City's sovereign immunity is waived to the extent of such liability
coverage." Id. For perspective on local government liability insurance, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurancein GeorgiaLocal Government Law, 24 MERCER L. REV.
651 (1973).
In the period case, Town of Register u. Fortner,262 Ga. App. 507, 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003),
the court of appeals considered a claim against the municipality for a collision at a railroad
crossing, a claim pursued under O.C.G.A. section 32-6-52, applying to unauthorized
vegetation at a crossing maintained in violation of statute, code, or local ordinance. Id. at
507-08, 586 S.E.2d at 56. The court held the municipality entitled to summary judgment
on grounds that the offending vegetation was located on railroad property, and that
plaintiff failed to show that the vegetation was "unauthorized." Id. at 508, 586 S.E.2d at
57.
110. For treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (1988); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia:The "Nuisance"Nuisance,12 GA. ST. B.J.
11 (1975).
111. 264 Ga. App. 535, 591 S.E.2d 447 (2003).
112. Id. at 535, 591 S.E.2d at 447.
113. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2000). For perspective on the ante litem notice requirement,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 145-74
(1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Municipal Tort Liability:Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L.
REV. 134 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem Notice: Cause for Pause,URBAN GA. MAG.
24 (Oct. 1978).
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claim for an event occurring earlier than the previous six months." 4
This was so, the court emphasized, "even if the event was part of a
continuing pattern of events, such as a continuing trespass or nuisance."" 5 Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment for the
city regarding the 1999 back-up.'
Claimant's nuisance efforts enjoyed greater success in Riggins v. City
of St. Marys,117 an action for injuries to a child struck by another
motorist at a traffic intersection."' Reviewing allegations of existing
surroundings, the court asserted that "the city was aware of a dangerous
condition at the intersection and that it failed to correct it for an
unreasonably lengthy time."" 9 Moreover, the evidence revealed no
negligence on the part of either driver. 20 Thus, the'record failed to
establish as a matter of law that the city had maintained no nui22
sance' 2 1 or that such nuisance had not contributed to the collision.

For these reasons, the court reversed the trial judge's dismissal of
plaintiff's claim."

114.

Cundy, 264 Ga. App. at 536, 591 S.E.2d at 448.

115. Id.
116. Id. The court observed that after the trial judge's ruling, plaintiff subsequently
dismissed with prejudice her claim for the latter event. Id. at 536 n.1, 591 S.E.2d at 448
n.1.
117. 264 Ga. App. 95, 589 S.E.2d 691 (2003).
118. Id. at 95, 589 S.E.2d at 691. Plaintiffs child was driving his father's car home
from school and testified that he stopped at the intersection's blinking light, pulled out into
the traffic and was struck. The other driver testified that he was driving at the speed limit
and did not see the other car until it was too late. Id. at 97, 589 S.E.2d at 693.
119. Id. at 99, 589 S.E.2d at 694.
120. Id. "It was therefore entirely possible that the city's maintenance of a dangerous
condition at the intersection contributed to the collision." Id.
121. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 694-95.
The police chief, the Navy, and the DOT all recommended that a traffic signal be
installed because of the increasing volume of traffic. The city initiated a SPLOST
to cover the cost of installing a traffic signal at the intersection, but even after the
tax referendum passed and the city collected sufficient funds to cover it, the city
further delayed installation by seeking to have the State pay for the project. This
evidence at least arguably satisfies all three [nuisance] guidelines.
Id.
122. Id. at 100, 589 S.E.2d at 695. "The trial court therefore erred in determining that
the negligence of the drivers was an intervening proximate cause of the collision absolving
the city from any responsibility for maintaining a nuisance." Id.
123. Id. at 102, 589 S.E.2d at 696. The court did however affirm the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiffs claim in negligence. Id.
The trial court properly concluded that the SPLOST referendum did not create a
duty to install a traffic light at the intersection before completing other SPLOST
projects and that the city was immune for its discretionary decision as to when to
install the light, to the extent not covered by liability insurance.
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Yet another exception to municipal immunity, the act of "inverse
condemnation," 124 constituted the (ill fated) remedy of choice in Hanson
v. City of Roswell.12 ' There, plaintiff property owner complained that
the city had mandated one-way traffic on a street abutting his commercial building. As a result, his parking lots were less accessible, causing
the loss of tenants and rental income. 126 "'An inverse condemnation
claim arises,'" explained the court of appeals, "'when the governmental
entity creates a condition on private property ...

that amounts to a

taking without compensation.' " 127 In this case, however, "the City
made no physical changes to [the street], nor did it prohibit traffic on the
street." 2 ' The one-way designation "did not prevent access to the
29
property from [the street], even if the access was less convenient."
The court affirmed the trial judge's finding that no compensable "taking"
had occurred. 30
The survey period's "constitutional tort" litigation likewise proved
unfruitful for claimants.' 3' Means v. City of Atlanta Police Department" featured a "§ 1983" action against both the municipality and
a city detective for an alleged arrest without probable cause."
Reviewing the record, the court of appeals concluded that plaintiff had
neither argued nor proved "that the city had a policy or custom of

Id. For perspective on the "duty" limitation of local government liability, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia'sPublic Duty Doctrine: The Supreme Court Held Hostage, 51 MERCER
L. REV. 73 (1999).
124. Hanson v. City of Roswell, 262 Ga. App. 671, 586 S.E.2d 341 (2003). For

treatment of the "inverse condemnation" concept, see R.

PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF

MuNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 134-45 (1988).
125. 262 Ga. App. 671, 586 S.E.2d 341 (2003).
126. Id. at 671, 586 S.E.2d at 342. Plaintiff alleged that "because of the changes,
drivers seeking access to the rear parking lots were forced to take a circuitous route which
was difficult for customers to locate and time-consuming and tedious for the tenants." Id.
127. Id. (quoting Shealy v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County, 244 Ga. App. 853,
856, 537 S.E.2d 105, 108 (2000)).
128. Id. at 673, 586 S.E.2d at 343.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). For background on Georgia local government law's

experience with § 1983 liability, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE New "PERSONS" (1984); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government and ConstitutionalTorts: In the GeorgiaCourts, 49 MERCER
L. REV. 1 (1997).
132. 262 Ga. App. 700, 586 S.E.2d 373 (2003).
133. Id. at 704-05, 586 S.E.2d at 376-77. Plaintiff complained of an arrest based solely
upon a corporate executive's investigation and report of a burglary without the city
detective's visiting the scene or conducting independent interviews. The case against
plaintiff was ultimately dead docketed. Id. at 706, 586 S.E.2d at 378.
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arresting individuals without probable cause."" As for the detective,
her statutory "qualified immunity" depended not upon "whether there
was actual probable cause [for the arrest], but whether there was
'arguable' probable cause."'
Under this standard the court held the
detective's issuance of an arrest citation, based on a corporate executive's
identification of1 plaintiff
as a prime suspect, amounted to no constitu6
tional violation.

1

The court reached a similar conclusion in Morris v. Johnson,'37
which concerned a § 1983 complaint that defendant police officer ordered
plaintiff's decedent to ride his motorcycle while intoxicated.' 38 Once
again, the court stressed plaintiff's "strenuous burden" of proving the
officer's violation of a "clearly established right." 39 Although plaintiff
showed "a factual issue" concerning decedent's state of intoxication, 4 '
the court was adamant:
We are not willing to hold that police officers who exercise their
judgment in good faith, based on their experience and training, could
be [held] liable because the opinions of the lay witnesses, or the results
of later scientific tests, show that-with the benefit of hindsight-a
different judgment should have been made.'
Indeed, the officer's disputed decisions "were precisely the kind of
discretionary
decisions for which qualified immunity provides protec" 1 42
tion.

134. Id. at 705, 586 S.E.2d at 377.
135. Id. at 706, 586 S.E.2d at 378. The court explained that officers possessed qualified
immunity under § 1983 "'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Id.
at 705, 586 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Thomas v. Holt, 221 Ga. App. 345, 347-48, 471 S.E.2d
300, 303 (1996)).
136. Id. at 706, 586 S.E.2d at 378. "[We do not find it unreasonable for [the detective]
to base her issuance of an arrest citation on the statement and report of the corporate
executive responsible for loss prevention." Id. The court affirmed the trial judge's grant
of summary judgment against plaintiffs § 1983 claim. Id.
137. 262 Ga. App. 182, 585 S.E.2d 375 (2003).
138. Id. at 182, 585 S.E.2d at 375. Plaintiff charged that defendant officer was called
to a public place where decedent was creating a disturbance, called the decedent outside
the establishment, and ordered the decedent to leave. The decedent died shortly thereafter
when he lost control of his motorcycle. Id. at 183, 585 S.E.2d at 376-77.
139. Id. at 183, 585 S.E.2d at 377.
140. Id. at 184, 585 S.E.2d at 377. Deposed witnesses stated that decedent's high state
of intoxication should have been obvious to the officer, but the officer testified that the
decedent did not appear intoxicated. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court affirmed summary judgment for the police officer. Id. at 185, 585
S.E.2d at 378.
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A closely divided supreme court resolved a novel issue under the
statute treating municipal liability, assuming liability insurance, for
injuries or death to "any person" resulting from high-speed police
chases. 143 For the pursuing officer's conduct to constitute the "proximate cause" of injury or death inflicted by the fleeing suspect, the
statute requires that the officer acted "with reckless disregard for proper
law enforcement procedures."'" In City of Winder v. McDougald,45
parents sought damages for the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter
who lost control of her car while being pursued by an officer for driving
without headlights. 146 Reversing both the trial court and the court of
appeals, the supreme court restricted the statute's applicability only to
innocent persons injured by a fleeing suspect.147 Accordingly, the
parents possessed no rights under the statute for the death of their
daughter.'"
Arising under the same statute, City of Pooler v. Edenfield 49
presented a scenario in which a police officer of one municipality chased
a speeder into another municipality. There, the second municipality's
officer assumed primary pursuit, with the first officer following as backup support. The fleeing suspect then struck and killed the driver of an
approaching vehicle whose representatives sued both municipalities. 5 °
Upon the second city's settlement with plaintiffs, the court of appeals
held no "proximate cause" on the part of the first municipality's police
officer.' 5' Rather, the court reasoned, the actions of the second officer

143. City of Winder v. McDougald, 276 Ga. 866, 583 S.E.2d 879 (2003). See O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-6(d) (2004).
144. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d).
145. 276 Ga. 866, 583 S.E.2d 879 (2003).
146. Id. at 866, 583 S.E.2d at 879. The daughter had taken her father's car without
permission and was driving inside the municipal limits, at 4:30 a.m., without turning on
the headlights. The officer began to follow her using his emergency light and, in
attempting to flee, the daughter lost control, struck a utility pole, and was killed. Id.
147. Id. The court reasoned that the legislature had amended the statute in 1995 by
substituting the "reckless disregard" standard for that of "negligence." Id. at 867, 583
S.E.2d at 880. "Because the legislature enacted [the amendment] to limit liability when
a fleeing suspect injures an innocent person, we conclude that the legislature did not
intend simultaneously to expand liability to cover injuries to the fleeing suspect." Id.
148. Id. at 866, 586 S.E.2d at 879. A three-justice dissenting opinion took strong issue
with the majority's interpretation of the statute. "While it may well be that affirming the
Court of Appeals would result in an amendment of the statute .... such a change is for the
General Assembly to make, not for this Court." Id. at 870, 583 S.E.2d at 883 (Benham, J.,
dissenting).
149. 263 Ga. App. 278, 587 S.E.2d 408 (2003).
150. Id. at 278, 587 S.E.2d at 408.
151. Id. at 281, 587 S.E.2d at 410. This was true, the court held, even assuming the
actions of the first officer were in reckless disregard of police procedures. Id.
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COUNTIES

Officers and Employees

Several of the period's litigated contests pitted the county governing
authority against other county officers or employees. Two cases, for
example, concerned the county commissioners' authority regarding
contracts executed by other county officers. The contract at issue in
DeKalb County v. DRS Investments, Inc.'5 constituted a consent order
executed by a "senior assistant county attorney" regarding a private
corporation's infraction of an outdoor sign ordinance."M5 The county
promptly challenged the superior court's entry of the order upon the
record on grounds that the agreement had not received the commissioners' prior approval."5 In review of the matter, the court of appeals
determined two reasons for rejecting the commissioners' contention that
First, during
the county attorney had exceeded his authority."
negotiations, the corporation's attorney specifically inquired into the
county attorney's contracting capabilities.'5 7 Second, the only material county ordinance simply provided that the county attorney "represents
the county in all court cases."'58 Because neither source "yielded any

152. Id. "The trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the [first municipality].' Id. at 282, 587 S.E.2d at 411.
153. 260 Ga. App. 225, 581 S.E.2d 573 (2003).
154. Id. at 225, 581 S.E.2d at 573. The corporation violated the height limitation of an
outdoor sign permit and the consent order required the corporation to lower its sign, enter
a plea of nolo contendere, and pay a fine. Id.
155. Id. at 225, 581 S.E.2d at 574. The commissioners moved to set aside the consent
order, "contending that the senior assistant county attorney had exceeded his authority by
failing to obtain the approval of [the commissioners]." Id.
156. Id. at 226-28, 581 S.E.2d at 574-76.
157. Id. at 227, 581 S.E.2d at 575. The court rested on O.C.GA- section 45-6-5 (2000),
requiring all persons to take notice of the power conferred upon public officers, and the
supreme court's decision in City ofAtlanta v. Black, 265 Ga. 425, 426, 457 S.E.2d 551, 552
(1995), that
[iut is the duty of any person dealing with a municipality in a contractual relation
to see that there has been a compliance with the mandatory provisions of the law
limiting and prescribing its powers, a duty which includes determining that the
public officer who executed a contract has the requisite authority.
DRS Investments, 260 Ga. App. at 226, 581 S.E.2d at 574. The private corporation's
attorney "fulfilled his obligation to determine the extent of the senior assistant county
attorney's authority to settle this matter." Id. at 227, 581 S.E.2d at 575.
158. Id. at 227, 581 S.E.2d at 575. See DEKALB COUNTY CODE art. I, § 3, app. A.
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express limitation upon the attorney's settlement authority,.., the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the county was bound by
the [contract]."159
The county contract power reviewed by the supreme court in Ward v.
City of Cairo'" focused upon the state court judge's selection of a
private probation service. More specifically, the judge challenged the
validity of a general statute subjecting such contracts to county
commissioner approval,'16 charging a violation of separation of powers. 2 The court discounted that contention, emphasizing its prior
admonition that "'[t]he separation of powers doctrine is sufficiently
flexible to permit practical arrangements in a complex government.'"'"
In this instance, the court explained, the practicality savored of financial
reality: "[Tihe probation process, and hence, the state court's selection
of a private probation services provider, financially impacts the [county]
governing authority.""'
Attaching the contract "to the governing
authority's
approval,"
therefore,
"does not invade the province of the
" 165
judiciary.
Compensation concerns fueled two survey period controversies. In
Montgomery County v. Sharpe, 6 those concerns emerged in the
county's suit to recover funds unlawfully received by the tax commissioner as commissions collected on automobile tag fees. 167 In affirming the
trial judge's decision against the county, the court of appeals embraced
the "doctrine of voluntary payment." 1" Under that doctrine the county

159. DRS Investments, 260 Ga. App. at 227, 581 S.E.2d at 575. The court did disagree
with the trial judge's decision that the county attorney's authority was "plenary," once
again relying upon the supreme court's decision in Black v. City of Atlanta, 265 Ga. 425,
457 S.E.2d 551 (1995) that "the presumption of plenary settlement authority does not apply
to attorneys who represent public entities." Id. at 226, 581 S.E.2d at 574.
160. 276 Ga. 391, 583 S.E.2d 821 (2003).
161. Id. at 393, 583 S.E.2d at 823. "The final contract negotiated by the chiefjudge...
shall be attached to the approval by the governing authority of the county to privatize
probation services as an exhibit thereto." O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(f)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2004).
162. Ward, 276 Ga. at 393, 583 S.E.2d at 823; see GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
163. Ward, 276 Ga. at 393,583 S.E.2d at 823 (quoting Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667,669,
212 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1975)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 261 Ga. App. 389, 582 S.E.2d 545 (2003).
167. Id. at 389, 582 S.E.2d at 546. The tax commissioner also served as the county tag
agent and received the commissions over the course of nine years. The commissioner did
not dispute the trial judge's decision that she was not entitled to receive a portion of the
tag fees as compensation, but she did contest the power of the county to recover the fees
already paid. Id.
168. Id. at 392, 582 S.E.2d at 548. The "doctrine" is established by O.C.G.A. section
13-1-13 (1981). Id.
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failed to show that the payments were "anything other than a mistake
of law on both [the tax commissioner's] and the auditors' parts."6 '
Thus, the county could not escape the doctrine's bar "when it paid the
amounts and then waited more than two years to file suit to recover the
monies paid." 17 °
Jennings v. McIntosh County Board of Commissioners' featured a
part-time county magistrate's action to mandamus payment of compensation and attorney fees. 7 2 The trial judge granted the mandamus for
the present year's compensation, denying recovery for back payments,
and rejecting plaintiff's request for attorney fees.' 7" On review the
supreme court affirmed the denial of back payment, on grounds that the
evidence of hours worked was far too inconclusive to support the
exacting demands of mandamus.' 74 However, the court took issue with
the trial judge's decision that because she had been "only partially
successful in her claim," plaintiff was entitled only to a portion of her
attorney fees.' 7' Rather, the court emphasized that plaintiff "prevailed
on the principal claim in her petition for writ of mandamus, which was
that her compensation should be in accord with that mandated by
statute."' 76 Consequently, the court held "[plaintiff] is entitled to the
full amount of reasonable attorney fees." 177

169. Id. at 390, 582 S.E.2d at 547.
170. Id. at 392, 582 S.E.2d at 548. "The sole issue was the amount of compensation,
all parties knew that [the commissioner] was being paid a commission from the fees, and

all parties were mistaken as to the law applicable to this issue." Id. at 393, 582 S.E.2d at
548.
171. 276 Ga. 842, 583 S.E.2d 839 (2003).
172. Id. at 842, 583 S.E.2d at 840. Plaintiff had served as county magistrate and,
simultaneously, as clerk of the magistrate court since 1989. Since 1996, O.C.GA. section
15-10-105(d) required an additional stipend for magistrates who also worked as clerk of the
court; thus, plaintiff sought to recover payment as mandated by state law. Id.
173. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 839.
174. Id. at 843, 583 S.E.2d at 840. "Many of the time records cited by [plaintiff] not
only fail to indicate whether she was working in a full-time or part-time capacity, but make
no clear distinction between hours actually worked and those in which she may have been
merely 'on call.'" Id. at 842, 583 S.E.2d at 841. Moreover, "the extraordinary writ of
mandamus will not lie unless the petitioner seeking it has a clear legal right to have the
act performed.'" Id. at 843, 583 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting Lansford v. Cook, 252 Ga. 414, 415,
314 S.E.2d 103, 104 (1984)). For perspective on the enormous part played by the writ of
mandamus in local government litigation, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUs IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOvERNMENT LAW (1989).

175. Jennings, 276 Ga. at 843, 583 S.E.2d at 840. The trial court had awarded less
than one-fifth of plaintiffs requested attorney fees. Id.
176. Id. at 847, 583 S.E.2d at 844.
177.

Id.
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A deputy sheriff's termination brought Barrett v. Sanders7 ' to the
court of appeals. 7 9 Although charged with felonies in three counties,
the deputy had never been convicted" and relied on county personnel
regulations to attack his discharge.'' Having failed to include a copy
of those regulations in the record, the court held that the deputy's
challenge was without foundation. 82 Under state legislation 1" the
court said the personnel board possessed "substantial evidence" showing
"sufficient, just, and proper cause" for termination."
"Absent any
applicable regulations, the fact that he has never been convicted of
criminal charges ... is irrelevant to the issue of whether he is subject
to discipline or discharge from his position as a police officer ....

Accordingly, the court reversed a reinstatement order. 88

B. Power
The survey period produced two classic "power" stand-offs, and the
supreme court upheld both challenged county endeavors. In BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Cobb County,"7 the county imposed a onetime "permit fee" on telecommunications companies applying to use the
county's public right-of-way. That imposition drew the subject company's attack, sounding in both lack of power and unconstitutionaliAs for power, the court emphasized general statutes expressly
ty."
empowering the county to "regulate" the installation of lines on rights-of-

178. 262 Ga. App. 63, 584 S.E.2d 676 (2003).
179. Id. at 63, 584 S.E.2d at 678. The trial judge reinstated the deputy and the county
sheriff appealed. Id.
180. Id. Accomplices, victims, and others directly implicated the deputy in a homeinvasion ring. He had been acquitted by a jury in one county, his case had been dead
docketed in another, and his file was lost in the third county. Id. at 63-64, 584 S.E.2d at
678.
181. Id. at 65, 584 S.E.2d at 679. The deputy argued "that construing the... County
Personnel Regulations as a whole shows that the county manager and the sheriff did not
have discretion to terminate or not reinstate [the deputy]." Id.
182. Id. at 66, 584 S.E.2d at 679. "The record before us does not contain a copy of the
regulations relied on by [the deputy], and nowhere in the superior court transcript does it
appear that [the deputy] attempted to introduce the regulations into evidence." Id.
183. Id., 584 S.E.2d at 680. "Without the regulations, we can only look to the state
legislation that created the... County Personnel Board and the... County merit system
in order to determine whether the sheriff and county manager had the necessary
authority." Id.
184. Id. (quoting 1982 Ga. Laws 4896).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 67, 584 S.E.2d at 680.
187. 277 Ga. 314, 588 S.E.2d 704 (2003).
188. Id. at 314, 588 S.E.2d at 704.
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From that grant, the county possessed implied authority to

impose a "permit fee" if "it is an administrative cost recoupment fee,

reasonably related to this regulation, as opposed to a tax intended to
produce revenue.""9 Canvassing the record, the court noted an outside
consultant's study and estimate of the county's costs in reviewing permit

applications. 19 It was clear "that the permit fees ... are designed to
recover the actual costs incurred .

.

. .""'

On the issue of equal

protection, the court sought reasons providing a "rational basis" for the
county's delineation between telecommunications companies and other
utilities. 9 3 The court determined two reasons existed. First, the
former "have applied for a disproportionately high number of permits in
recent years.""9 Second, they have also "caused a disproportionately
high amount of damage and disruption."'9 5
Strykr v. Long County Board of Commissioners9 6 featured a
challenge to county amendments of its solid waste services ordinance.
Those amendments empowered the county to contract with private
enterprises to provide garbage collection services to residents of
unincorporated areas and to bill for curbside collections. 197 In rejecting
98
plaintiff's attack, the court rebuffed an assortment of contentions.
Discounting an argument based on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,' 99 the
court declared the county actions "expressly contemplated by the State
in the enactment of the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Manage-

189. Id. at 315, 588 S.E.2d at 705. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 32-4-42
(2001 & Supp. 2004). Id.
190. Id. The court distinguished between "regulation," implied under the police power,
and "taxation," requiring statutory authority to produce revenue. Id.
191. Id. The county had instructed the consultant "to be conservative in its estimate
to ensure that the fees charged would not exceed the costs incurred." Id. The court
reasoned that "[iut is certainly reasonable for [the] County to require BellSouth to
reimburse it for expenses incurred at BellSouth's request." Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 316, 588 S.E.2d at 706.
194. Id. "The record shows that since September 1999, 64 [percent] of the permits to
use the county's rights-of-way went to telephoneand telecommunications companies, while
only 36 [percent] of those permits went to all other utilities combined." Id. (emphasis in
original).
195. Id. at 317, 588 S.E.2d at 706. "This creates more expense for the county." Id.
The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the county. Id.
196. 277 Ga. 624, 593 S.E.2d 348 (2004).
197. Id. at 625, 593 S.E.2d at 348.
198. Id.
199. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997). For perspective on anti-trust law in the context of
local government, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AS
HOME RULE WRECKER (1982), reprinted in 34 MERCER L. REv. 363 (1982).
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The court also turned aside an objection that the

ordinance unlawfully granted the power of taxation.2 1 The county
was free to enforce waste collection service fees in the same manner as
that authorized for the collection of taxes.20 2 Dismissing the contention that the ordinance did not serve the best interests of the citizens,
the court denominated that question was one "properly for determination
by the Commissioners." °3 Finally, the court summarily rejected the
argument that the county lacked power to privatize garbage fee
ordinance ... was a legal exercise of the
collection: "IT]he amended
2
County's authority." 1

C. Regulation
A range of diverse subjects--dogs, trees, floods, and adult entertainment-attracted county regulatory efforts during the year. Those efforts
in turn attracted litigation. 20 5

2
Accordingly, Savage v. State 01 fo-

cused upon defendant's conviction of violating ordinances regulating the
care of dogs.2' On appeal defendant initially challenged the accusa-

200. Strykr, 277 Ga. at 625, 593 S.E.2d at 349. "Because the County's actions were
pursuant to state policy, [plaintiffs'] claims based on Georgia antitrust laws are likewise
without merit. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-65-1, 36-65-2." Id.
201. Id. 'The state may not suspend or irrevocably give, grant, limit, or restrain the
right of taxation and all laws, grants, contracts, and other acts to effect any of these
purposes are null and void." GA. CONST. art. VII, § 2, para. 1.
202. Strykr, 277 Ga. at 625, 593 S.E.2d at 349. "Counties that provide solid waste
collection services are authorized to enforce by ordinance the collection of fees 'in the same
manner as authorized by law for the enforcement of the collection and payment of state
taxes, fees, or assessments.'" Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 12-8-39.3(a) (2001)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 626, 593 S.E.2d at 350.
[A]lthough the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act does not
expressly confer upon counties the authority to privatize the collection of fees for
the garbage services, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the
amended ordinance, including the fee collection provisions, was a legal exercise of
the County's authority.
Id.
205. For perspective on the local government regulatory power, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., "Ascertainable Standards" versus 'Unbridled Discretion" in Local Government
Regulation, 41 GA. CouNTY GOVERNMENT MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039
(1981); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in GeorgiaLocal
Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
206. 263 Ga. App. 180, 587 S.E.2d 294 (2003).
207. Id. at 180, 587 S.E.2d at 294. These included failing to restrain dogs, creating a
public nuisance, keeping a vicious animal, and failing to display a vaccination tag. Id.
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tion's failure to specify "in which way her [dogs] were not restrained."20 Characterizing this argument as making "no sense," the
court of appeals read the accusation to charge that "none of these
[ordinance prescribed] restraints were present."2" The court was
likewise unreceptive to defendant's vagueness attack on the county's
public nuisance ordinance."' First, "the definition of public nuisance
(allowing an animal to damage the property of others) is sufficiently
clear as to the scope of the forbidden conduct." 1' Second, "[t]here is
no constitutional requirement that the damage be valued at a particular
dollar amount."212 Finally, the court concluded that the ordinances
"were primarily safety in nature and did not require a showing of malice
21 3
or intent to prove a violation."

The supreme court also actively participated in judging county
214
regulations. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n v. DeKalb County
presented an arsenal of objections by real property developers to the
county's tree protection ordinance. 21' Rejecting a complaint based on
non-compliance with the Zoning Procedures Law,2 1 6 the court empha-

sized the ordinance's failure to "zone.""' Rather, "viewed as a whole,"
the measure did not regulate "according to zones or districts," and "the
majority of [its] requirements apply uniformly to all land and to all land
disturbance activities regardless of the location of that land within the

208. Id. at 181, 587 S.E.2d at 296.
209. Id. at 182, 587 at 297. "The listed ways in which an animal may be restrained are
possible defenses, not possible violations." Id.
210. Id. at 183, 587 S.E.2d at 297.
211. Id.
We examine the [ordinance] in light of the facts of the case at hand ... and hold
that dogs that go onto neighboring property and viciously attack another's animals
(resulting in severe harm to those animals) clearly are "public nuisances" under
the challenged ordinance, which as worded gave sufficient notice to a person of
ordinary intelligence of this forbidden conduct.
Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 184, 587 S.E.2d at 298. 'Statutes which are primarily safety statutes may
legitimately impose strict criminal liability for the inherently dangerous acts therein
prohibited." Id. at 183, 587 S.E.2d at 297. The court thus affirmed plaintiffs conviction.
Id. at 184, 587 S.E.2d at 298.
214. 277 Ga. 295, 588 S.E.2d 694 (2003).
215. Id. at 295, 588 S.E.2d at 695. The ordinance, inter alia, required developers
applying for building or land development permits to follow tree preservation and
replacement standards, specified those standards with a high degree of particularity, and
permitted only selective tree harvesting. Id.
216. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -6 (2000).
217. GreaterAtlanta, 277 Ga. at 296, 588 S.E.2d at 696.
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County."218 In regard to plaintiffs' "regulatory takings" charge,219 the
court denominated the attack "a facial challenge" 220 and administered
222
22
the applicable "tests." '

Finding no loss of "economic viability,"

the court denied that the ordinance destroyed plaintiffs' ability to
develop their land; "it only regulates the way in which new and existing
trees must be managed during the development process." 2" Finally,
the court dismissed a contention of state preemption: The relevant state
statute applied only to timber harvesting operations "not incidental to
development," 224 and the tree ordinance's only timber harvesting
regulations "are incidental to development." 225 The court thus affirmed
the trial judge's ordinance approval.2 26
The court yet again distinguished "regulation" from "zoning" in Union
County v. CGP Inc.,227 which concerned litigation over a county flood
damage prevention ordinance. 2' A subdivision developer challenged

218. Id. "Mhe Tree Ordinance applies uniformly to all land in [the unincorporated
county] by regulating the effect that development will have on tree coverage in the
County." Id.
219. "Appellants contend that the Tree Ordinance effects a regulatory taking of their
property without just compensation." Id.
220. As contrasted with an "as applied" challenge, which must meet a ripeness
requirement. Id.
221. Id. at 296-97, 588 S.E.2d at 696. "Appellants must show that the 'ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.'" Id. at 297, 588 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 260 (1980)).
222. Id. at 297, 588 S.E.2d at 697. "Courts generally conclude that so long as an
ordinance allows some permissible use, a party will not be able to satisfy its burden of
showing a complete lack of economically viable use." Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 300, 588 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 12-6-24(e)(4)(A) (2001 & Supp.
2004)).
225. Id., 588 S.E.2d at 699.
226. Id. An elaborate, meticulous, and forceful dissenting opinion disapproved the
ordinance on both "statutory and constitutional grounds," characterizing its nature as
extremely "draconian." Disagreeing with the majority opinion on virtually every point, the
dissent viewed the ordinance as a zoning ordinance, an unlawful taking of property, and
preempted by state law. Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
227. 277 Ga. 349, 589 S.E.2d 240 (2003).
228. Plaintiff developer alleged unofficial approval of his development in the county,
the purchase of the land, the acquisition of some building permits from the county, and
state approval of his septic system. He sought a mandamus to require the county to issue
the necessary permits needed to complete his subdivision development. The trial court
upheld the validity of the flood ordinance, refused to issue mandamus, but held plaintiff
possessed a vested right to the additional building permits necessary to complete the
development. Id. at 349-50, 589 S.E.2d at 241.

376

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

the measure under the Zoning Procedures Law,2" only to be advised
that the ordinance did not "classify property into separate districts."2 "0
Plaintiff also suffered reversal of the trial judge's decision that, in light
of expenditures and acquired building permits, he possessed a vested
right to complete his development in violation of the flood ordinance.23 '
On grounds that "estoppel will not lie against a county government"2" 2
and that "vested rights do not arise from the issuance of illegal building
permits," the court held the challenger bereft of any vested right to
development.2"
In I.D.K, Inc. v. Ferdinand,' the court considered an ordinance
requiring employees of adult entertainment establishments that served
alcohol to purchase a permit. 5 The court first determined that the
ordinance was "content neutral"2 8 because of its purpose to combat
negative secondary effects on neighborhoods. 7 So characterized, the
measure need meet only the "less stringent" standard of furthering an
important governmental interest unrelated to speech suppression.2 3
That standard found justification, in turn, by evidence of a narrowly
tailored application to control criminal behavior and prevent undesirable
community conditions. 9 Holding the ordinance "a proper exercise of
county police power," the court next inquired into the charge of "prior

229. O.C.GA. §§ 36-66-1 to 6.
230. CGP, Inc., 277 Ga. at 353, 589 S.E.2d at 243. The ordinance applies "to all
property in the county subject to a specified physical phenomenon, specifically, periodic
flooding." Id.
231. Id. at 351, 589 S.E.2d at 242.
232. Id. For perspective on the role of estoppel in the law of Georgia local government
law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).
233. CGP, Inc., 277 Ga. at 351,589 S.E.2d at 242. "Unofficial approval of CGP's plans
without regard to the restrictions of the flood ordinances would frustrate [the]... County's

duty to its residents to enforce the law." Moreover, "[the fact that [the] ... County issued
building permits is equally unavailing to CGP." Id.
234. 277 Ga. 548, 592 S.E.2d 673 (2004).
235. Id. at 548,592 S.E.2d at 673. The ordinance applied to all employees and required
that the permit be renewed annually. Id.
236. Id. at 549, 592 S.E.2d at 674. "[We must first determine whether the legislation
is content-based or content-neutral because that determination controls the level of
scrutiny to be applied." Id.
237. Id. "[Tihe County relied on testimony given at a public hearing, studies of other
jurisdictions, and evidence of problems within its own jurisdiction." Id.
238. Id., 592 S.E.2d at 674-75.
239. Id. at 550, 592 S.E.2d at 675. The court relied upon its earlier decision in
Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997), which applied the
standards of ParamountPictures Corp. v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982).
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Emphasizing county evidence that fees "were just
restraint."2 4 °
adequate to cover the expenses of administering and enforcing the
permitting scheme," the court cleared the ordinance of any "prior
restraint" stigma.2 41
Efforts to mandamus local government licensing accounted for two
controversies. Augusta-Richmond County v. Lee242 featured county
denial of an application to sell beer and wine,24 with the supreme
court requiring a showing of governmental "capriciousness" devoid of
"objective criteria contained in the [county] code." 2 " Because the code
contained criteria 45 and because evidence revealed county reliance
upon that criteria,246 the court reversed the trial judge's grant of
mandamus. 47
Enjoying far more success, plaintiff in Southland Outdoors, Inc. v.
reissuance
a mandamus
County'
obtained
Putnam
Indeed,
range.249
a shooting county
permits forcompelling
building
revoked
of previously

240. I.D.K, Inc., 277 Ga. at 551, 592 S.E.2d at 675. Fees intended for the purpose of
reimbursing costs of administering the licensing scheme "have been held by the U.S.
Supreme Court to withstand constitutional muster in Cox v. New Hampshire,312 U.S. 569
(1941)." Id., 592 S.E.2d at 675-76.
241. Id., 592 S.E.2d at 676. "Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's failure
to find the fee program unconstitutional as a prior restraint on protected expression." Id.
242. 277 Ga. 483, 592 S.E.2d 71 (2004).
243. Plaintiff sought a retail package license for her convenience store. Id. at 483, 592
S.E.2d at 71.
244. Id. at 484, 592 S.E.2d at 72. "In order for a writ of mandamus to be properly
issued, the Commission's decision must have been arbitrary and capricious and not based
on specific, objective criteria contained in the [County] Code." Id. For the special nature
of the writ of mandamus in local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1989).
245. The county code allowed "the Commission to consider the effect on the character
of the neighborhood and surrounding property values, the number of alcohol licenses in the
area, and whether minors may congregate in the area." Lee, 277 Ga. at 484, 592 S.E.2d
at 72.
246. At the hearing on the application, one of the commissioners commented on the
stigma attached to plaintiffs store, the number of stores in the area already selling alcohol,
and the store's proximity to schools and churches. Id.
247. Id. "[Tihe Commission's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and the trial
court erred in granting mandamus relief." Id.
248. 265 Ga. App. 399, 593 S.E.2d 940 (2004).
249. The county had originally granted the permits for the range, a use expressly
included within the subject property's zoned district, but later revoked its action when
neighboring landowners objected to the range. At that later point, the county had also
changed its zoning ordinance in respect to shooting ranges. On plaintiff's request for
mandamus, the trial court found vested property rights and issued the writ, but denied
plaintiffs motion for attorney fees. Id. at 399-400, 593 S.E.2d at 941-42.
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250
the only remaining issue comprised plaintiff's claim to attorney fees.
In resolution the court of appeals reviewed the material statute's
requirement that the subject party's position "lacked substantial
justification."2 5' With the record indicating virtually no substantive
consideration of the revocation decision and with the county's failure to
call witnesses, the case resonated attorney fees.2"2 It was clear, the
court asserted,
"that the County's position was without factual or legal
2

support."

1

D.

Contracts
The court of appeals invalidated county contracts on two occasions
during the period under review. The first instance arose in Howard v.
Brantley County," a county's action for money it had paid defendant
for paint striping on county roads. The chairman of the county
commission negotiated the paint striping agreement,255 defendant
performed the work incrementally,2 5 and the county paid each of
defendant's invoices." 7 Upon the county's subsequent suit for money
had and received,255 the
court first held that road striping was not a
"specialized service."259 Consequently, the agreement violated the
general statute mandating a competitive bidding process for county

250. Id. at 400, 593 S.E.2d at 942. "The only issue before us is whether the [trial] court
erred in determining that the County's defense was not so lacking in merit as to warrant
the sanctions of [O.C.G.A. section] 9-15-14." Id.
251. Id. at 401, 593 S.E.2d at 942. The sanctioned party must have acted in such a
way that "itcould not be reasonably believed that a court would accept [its] asserted claim,
defense, or other position." Id. at 400, 593 S.E.2d at 942.
252. Id. at 401, 593 S.E.2d at 942. Plaintiff introduced "the depositions of the county
commissioners which showed that they could not articulate a legally cognizable reason to
justify their revocation of the building permit. Furthermore, the County did not put up any
evidence and called no witnesses to testify at either the hearing on the petition for mandamus or the hearing on the request for attorney fees." Id.
253. Id. at 402, 593 S.E.2d at 942.
254. 260 Ga. App. 330, 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).
255. There was no written contract, and the chairman had negotiated for the work with
the agreement of two of the other four commissioners. Id. at 331, 579 S.E.2d at 759.
256. Defendant invoiced the county six times upon completing each segment of the
work. Id. at 330, 579 S.E.2d at 759.
257. Id, at 330-31, 579 S.E.2d at 759. The county paid each invoice in full for a total
sum of $190,600. Id. at 330, 579 S.E.2d at 759.
258. Defendant completed the job in June 2000, and the county filed suit in May 2001.
Id. at 330, 579 S.E.2d at 759.
259. Id. at 331, 579 S.E.2d at 760. "[O.C.G.A. section] 32-1-3(6) expressly defines road
striping as a form of road construction." Id.
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26 1
contracts 2" and "was illegal as beyond [the] County's authority."
262
money.
the
recover
could
The county, the court thus concluded,
A second restraint on county contracting capabilities results from the
historic statutory prohibition that "[o]ne council may not, by an
ordinance, bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in
matters of municipal government."2" Long held applicable to counties
as well as municipalities, the "binding contracts" limitation suffers a
legacy of judicial confusion. 64 In Buckhorn Ventures, LLC v. Forsyth
County,2' however, the court possessed no analytical qualms in
applying the mandate to a court order incorporating a 1992 settlement
In that agreement the county and a private corporation
agreement. 2
stipulated the uses to be made of specified property and no later zoning
ordinances could abridge those uses. 2 ' This commitment purported
to limit the county's "legislative" power of zoning and violated the
Consequently, "the settlement
"binding contracts" proscription. 2 s
agreement..., which restricts the [county] Board's ability to decide land

use planning in perpetuity, is prohibited

. . ..

29

The judicial order

260. "[O.C.G.A. section] 32-4-63(1) bars counties from negotiating contracts in excess
of $20,000, and contracts for road striping in amounts greater than $20,000 are not exempt
from the competitive bidding process as a 'specialized service.'" Id. at 332, 579 S.E.2d at
760.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 330, 579 S.E.2d at 758. The court also indicated the contract's invalidity as
violating O.C.G.A. section 36-10-1 (2000), requiring that "[aill contracts entered into by the
county... shall be in writing and entered on the minutes." Id. For discussion of this
requirement in county law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County Contractsin Georgia:"Written
and Entered," 32 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980).
263. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (2000).
264. For treatment of the matter, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and
Contracts That Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in
Georgia Local Government Law: Recent Perspectives, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 148 (1975); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Configurations of
Codification, 24 GA. L. REV. 95 (1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in County
Government-Never Mind, GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 28 (Mar. 1991); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
The Georgia Supreme Court and Local Government Law: Two Sheets to the Wind, 16 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 361 (1999).
265. 262 Ga. App. 299, 585 S.E.2d 229 (2003).
266. Plaintiff corporation sought to hold the county in contempt for failure to comply
with the court order. Id. at 299, 585 S.E.2d at 229.
267. Id. at 302, 585 S.E.2d at 232. "In other words, the agreement bound forever future
... County commissioners from changing the zoning designation of the subject property
to prohibit or otherwise restrict the use that was the subject matter of the agreement." Id.
268. Id. at 303, 585 S.E.2d at 233.
The court expressed its general approval of parties resolving their
269. Id.
disagreements through settlement agreements, but recognized "thatin this area of the law,
there is an innate conflict between entering binding contracts and preserving the ability

MERCER LAW REVIEW

380

[Vol. 56

incorporating an "ultra vires act" imposed no obstacle to future county
zoning activities. °
E.

Openness

A terminated employee, having prevailed under the Open Meetings
Act271 against the county governing authority,2 then sought, in
Moon v. Terrell County,"3 both back pay and attorney fees. With
respect to back pay, the court of appeals emphasized that the constitution's waiver of governmental immunity for contract claims applies only
to written contracts.274 Consequently, the plaintiff, an employee at will
without a written contract, "could not assert a claim for back pay under
Georgia law."275 As for attorney fees, plaintiff must show the commissioners acted "without substantial justification" in violating the open
meetings mandate.2 76 In that regard the record revealed that plaintiff
himself requested the closed meeting 277 and that "the commissioners
acted out of concern for his privacy."278 Accordingly, the court sustained the trial judge's finding of "substantial justification" and its
denial of attorney fees.279

to govern." Id. Interestingly, the court declared the supreme court's remarkable decision
in City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins, 270 Ga. 183, 508 S.E.2d 161 (1998),
immaterial "because it applies... to contracts between municipalities." Id., 585 S.E.2d
at 232.
270. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 232. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's refusal to grant
relief to plaintiff corporation. Id.
271. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2002). For perspective on the requirements of openness
in Georgia local government law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness"in Local
Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
272. Moon v. Terrell County, 249 Ga. App. 567, 548 S.E.2d 680 (2001).
273. 260 Ga. App. 433, 579 S.E.2d 845 (2003).
274. Id. at 434-35, 579 S.E.2d at 846-47. The provision waives sovereign immunity
for "any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract." Id. at 435, 579 S.E.2d
at 847 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 4).
275. Id. at 434, 579 S.E.2d at 847. "Here the record contains no written contract
between [plaintiff former employee] and the county." Id. at 435, 579 S.E.2d at 847.
276. Id. at 435, 579 S.E.2d at 847. The court emphasized that "(i]n reviewing such an
award, we apply a 'clearly erroneous' standard to the determination of substantial
justification on the part of the commission." Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5(b) (2002)).
277. Although plaintiff could not waive requirements of the statute intended for the
benefit of the general public, "his conduct does speak to the commissioners' reasonable
justification for closing the meeting." Id. at 435-36, 579 S.E.2d at 847.
278. Id. at 436, 579 S.E.2d at 847.
279. Id., 579 S.E.2d at 847-48. "[The trial court's determination that the commissioners acted with substantial justification was not clearly erroneous." Id.
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F. Roads
Georgia statutory law authorizes county citizens to mandamus the
governing authority to insure that "public roads" are in such condition
"that ordinary loads, with ordinary ease and facility, can be continuously
hauled over such public roads."8 0 When a Florida resident employed
this statute, charging the county's refusal to remedy an obstruction to
his property's access road, the trial judge denied standing.2"' In Gaw
v. Telfair County Board of Commissioners,2 ' plaintiff asserted the
statute's violation of equal protection in limiting the mandamus remedy
to county residents.2 3 In respose the supreme court likewise rebuffed
the plaintiff, but on the point of mootness. 8 4 After the trial judge
acted, the court explained, the county commissioners "abandoned all
County interest in the road at issue;" thus, the road "is no longer a
'public road' within the meaning of [the st-Atute]."
G. Finances
At issue in City of Decatur v. DeKalb County26 was the validity of
an intergovernmental contract under which the county agreed to
under
annually disburse to municipalities a portion of proceeds collected
2 7 statute. 288
the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax ("HOST)
Although the statute requires the expenditure of not more than twenty
percent of tax receipts for capital outlay projects, a purpose the
agreement was intended to facilitate, 8 9 the court of appeals held that
county tax expenditures could not be administered by municipalities. 2 °

280. O.C.G-A. § 9-6-21(b) (1981).
281. Gaw v. Telfair County Bd. of Comm'rs, 277 Ga. 157, 158, 587 S.E.2d 50, 50-51
(2003). Plaintiff complained of an obstruction to his property's only access road by a gate
installed by a citizen. The trial judge dismissed the action on grounds that plaintiff was
a resident and citizen of Florida and not of the county. Id. at 158, 587 S.E.2d at 51.

282. 277 Ga. 157, 587 S.E.2d 50 (2003).
283. Plaintiff complained that the statute "makes mandamus an available remedy to
county residents, but denies it to those who, like him, are not county residents but
nonetheless own land which they must be able to access." Id. at 158-59, 587 S.E.2d at 51.
284. Id. at 159, 587 S.E.2d at 51.
285. Id. "[Tihe issue of the constitutionality of [the statute] is moot." Id. The court
did hold, however, that the trial judge's dismissal of the mandamus issue did not dismiss
plaintiff's action against the obstructing citizen, nor "any claim [plaintiff] may have against
the County for injunctive or monetary relief." Id.
286. 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561 (2003).
287. O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-100 to -143 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
288. City of Decatur, 277 Ga. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562.
289. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-104(c)(2)(A) (2004).
290. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. App. 868, 567 S.E.2d 332 (2002).
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The court quoted from the supreme court's decision in City of Augusta
v. Mangelly291 as follows: "[Ilt can never be a valid county purpose to
provide [its tax] revenue to a municipality ....

."9

On this reasoning,

the court invalidated the contract.29 '
During the survey period the supreme court reviewed and reversed. 294 Effective since Mangelly, the court expounded, the constitution authorized a "special district" tax that was no longer a "county tax"
within the meaning of the earlier decision. 295 Accordingly, the HOST
statute, authorized by the more recent provision, coupled with the
constitution's intergovernmental contracts authorization,29 6 sufficiently
undergirded the disbursement contract between the county and its
cities. 297 "HOST ... implements a district tax under the 'special
district'... provision... [and] [Ut does not violate Mangelly's proscriptions on county taxes . ."298
Yet another sales tax issue of pivotal significance sharply divided the
supreme court in Haugen v. Henry County.299 The "Special Purpose
Local Option Sales Tax" statute"w ("SPLOST") directs that the county
can use excess funds produced by the levied tax only to reduce county ad
valorem taxes.'' The statute defines excess proceeds as revenues
received "in excess of the estimated cost of the capital outlay project or
projects stated in the resolution ...

or in excess of the actual cost of

such capital outlay project or projects."

°2

The issue in Haugen focused

291. 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
292. City of Decatur, 255 Ga. App. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Augusta v.
Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 362, 254 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1979)).
293. Id. For the peculiar history of the Georgia law of county taxation, and the
ramifications of that history, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The County Spending Power: An
Abbreviated Audit of the Account, 16 GA. L. REV. 599 (1982); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Law and the Constitution of 1983: Selected Shorts, reprinted in R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

565 (1983); R.

Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Litigation:Some Pivotal Precepts,55 MERCER L. REV.
1 (2003).
294. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561.
295. Id. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562. "The statute at issue in Mangelly was not enacted
pursuant to the special district provision of the Constitution, which is currently found at
Article IX, Section [2], Paragraph [6].- Id. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562.
296. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1.
297. City of Decatur,277 Ga. at 294, 589 S.E.2d at 562.
298. Id. Accordingly, the court rejected the county's argument that the disbursement
contract was void, the argument the county tendered in defense to the municipalities' suit
against it for breach of contract. Id.
299. 277 Ga. 743, 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004).
300. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-110 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
301. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-121(g)(2) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
302. Id. § 48-8-121(g)(1)(B).
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on sales tax proceeds exceeding the amount stated in the county's
SPLOST resolution but not exceeding the actual cost of the listed
projects. °3 Could revenues in excess3 °4of the resolution amount be spent
to complete the unfinished projects?
The court's four-justice majority opinion sketched the statute's
"determinative factors" as "the estimated and the actual cost[s] of the
project. " 305 Yet, the court insisted, the statute failed to address the
case at hand: the case in which "the net tax proceeds exceed the
estimated, but not the actual cost, of the project."3M Although the
statute employed the connective "or" to separate "estimated" and "actual"
costs, still "[t]here is nothing in the statute to support the conclusion
that the estimated cost invariably controls over the actual cost."307
Moreover, under a construction consonant with "common sense," "sound
reasoning," and other statutory provisions, 0 8 "the actual cost, rather
than estimated cost, establishes the maximum amount of SPLOST
revenue that can be expended." 30 9 Accordingly, the county was free to
use tax proceeds exceeding the estimated cost of the projects to complete

303. The SPLOST resolution authorized a tax for a period of five years to raise not
more than $60 million for road and street repair and specific capital projects. During the
five-year period, the tax generated more than $71.8 million. When the county sought to
expend amounts exceeding $60 million on some of the unfinished projects, plaintiff
taxpayer objected on grounds that the funds in excess of $60 million must be used to
reduce ad valorem taxes. Haugen, 277 Ga. at 743, 594 S.E.2d at 325-26.
304. "[The issue to be decided is whether the County is entitled to use the $11.8
million plus accrued interest to complete the projects before it can be charged with
possessing any 'excess' SPLOST proceeds." Id. at 744, 594 S.E.2d at 326. The trial court
dismissed plaintiffs action, holding that the funds could be used on the unfinished projects.
Id.
305. Id. at 745, 594 S.E.2d at 326.
306. Id.
307. Id. "The dissent simply assumes that, because the General Assembly used the
word 'or' to separate the two alternatives, whichever cost is the lesser would control, with
the result that the estimated cost establishes the maximum amount of SPLOST revenue
that can be expended on the project." Id.
308. "[O.C.GA section] 48-8-121(a)(1) expressly provides that '[tihe proceeds received
from the tax authorized by this article shall be used by the county exclusively for the
purpose or purposes specified in the resolution or ordinance calling for imposition of the
tax.'" Id. Thus, said the court, "the taxing authority must necessarily use all SPLOST
proceeds to complete the projects for which the tax was imposed, before any revenue
derived from the tax can be deemed to be 'excess' and available for use in connection with
another purpose." Id. at 745-46, 594 S.E.2d at 327.
309. Id. at 746, 594 S.E.2d at 327. "While estimated 'or' actual cost are the applicable
standards for determining 'excess proceeds,' on those occasions when actual cost exceeds
estimated cost, actual cost is the determinative standard." Id.
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unfinished projects;3 1 ° those proceeds did not constitute "excess"
revenues allotted exclusively to reducing ad valorem taxes. 1
H.

Liability
Sovereign immunity barred lawsuits against counties in several
contexts. 312 Middlebrooks v. Bibb County3 1 3 presented a wrongful
death action for the suicide of plaintiff's decedent while incarcerated in
3 4
Emphasizing the constitutional basis of county
the county jail..
3
1
5
immunity, the court of appeals made short work of affirming the
trial judge's denial of recovery. 16 The court reached a similar result
in Smith v.Chatham County,317 a suit for plaintiff's injuries resulting

310. Id. "Thus, even though the tax proceeds received by the taxing authority may
exceed the estimated cost of any given unfinished project, no 'excess' proceeds exist so long
as the project remains incomplete." Id.
311. Id. "The trial court correctly interpreted the relevant statutory provisions and,
therefore, properly dismissed [plaintiffs] petition. . . ." Id. A forceful dissenting opinion
for three justices charged the majority with a "strained analysis" that "nullifies the
statutory provision and deprives the taxpayers of the rightful reduction of their tax
burden." Id. at 747, 594 S.E.2d at 328 (Hines, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that
"it is the estimated cost, in this case $60 million, that is proposed and presented to the
taxpayers for their approval. And it is this estimated cost that the General Assembly has
clearly determined to be one of two yardsticks by which to measure 'excess proceeds' under
[the statute.]" Id. at 748, 594 S.E.2d at 328 (Hines, J., dissenting). Finally,
[tihe result is that the burden of the uncompleted county projects is shifted to the
unwitting taxpayer, rather than holding the taxing authority accountable for a
seemingly unrealistic assessment of cost and/or project scope. It forces the
taxpayers of [the] County to fund county projects in an amount which was never
disclosed, and certainly never approved by them.
Id., 594 S.E.2d at 329 (Hines, J., dissenting).
312. For perspective on county tort immunity, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local
Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST.
U. L. REV.405 (1993). See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government LiabilityLitigation:
Numerical Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004).
313. 261 Ga. App. 382, 582 S.E.2d 539 (2003).
314. Id. at 382, 582 S.E.2d at 539. As a known suicide risk, decedent was placed in a
holding cell and monitored. He was last seen alive about 2 a.m. and his death was not
discovered until around 9 a.m. He had asphyxiated himself by placing a tourniquet around
his neck. Id. at 383, 582 S.E.2d at 542.
315. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 4. "The Supreme Court of Georgia held that sovereign
immunity extends to counties under the 1991 constitutional amendment." Middlebrooks,
261 Ga. App. at 384, 582 S.E.2d at 542.
316. Middlebrooks, 261 Ga. App. at 384, 582 S.E.2d at 542. "There was no error in the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to [the] County." Id.
317. 264 Ga. App. 566, 591 S.E.2d 388 (2003).
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from being struck by a truck pursued by a county police officer.31 The
claimant alleged the county's waiver of immunity under legislative
authority to purchase liability insurance for motor vehicles. 19 When
pressed for proof,320 plaintiff showed only the county's maintenance of
"a claims and judgment fund" within its budget.32' That proof, the
court held, fell short of establishing waiver.322 The material statute
the
allows waiver "only where an insurance policy is purchased,"
court emphasized, and does not operate on a self-insurance plan.
The motor vehicle insurance statute drew the court's attention yet
again in Robinson v. DeKalb County,32 a claim for the drowning of
plaintiff's husband.32 6 There, the county had purchased the authorized
insurance and, plaintiff urged, had thereby waived immunity for
negligence in failing to equip its fire truck with a rescue rope. 7
Again the court focused upon the language of the statute,3 2 emphasiz-

318. The officer sought to stop the truck in his investigation of car break-ins and thefts
at automobile dealerships. Id. at 566-57, 591 S.E.2d at 389.
319. Id. at 567, 591 S.E.2d at 389. The statute empowers local governments to
purchase liability insurance for the negligent operation of motor vehicles and to waive
immunity to the extent of the coverage purchased. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (1996 & Supp.
2004). For the history of the statute and its applicability in the case law, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurancein Georgia Local GovernmentLaw, 24 MERCER L. REV.
651 (1973).
320. On the county's denial of insurance purchase, plaintiffs had the burden of proving
the fact. Smith, 264 Ga. App. at 567, 591 S.E.2d at 389.
321. Id. at 568, 591 S.E.2d at 390. "The County has established a method of paying
for some claims out of its budget." Id.
322. Id. at 569, 591 S.E.2d at 390.
323. Id. at 568-69, 591 S.E.2d at 390. "Statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed." Id. For perspective on the Georgia Supreme Court's historical
treatment of statutes in derogation of the common law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutes
in Derogationof the Common Law: In the Georgia Supreme Court, 53 MERCER L. REV. 41
(2001).
324. Id. at 568, 591 S.E.2d at 390. "There is no statute which provides that by
establishing a self-insurance plan, a county waives sovereign immunity." Id. Accordingly,
the county in this case "was entitled to sovereign immunity." Id. at 569, 591 S.E.2d at 390.
325. 261 Ga. App. 163, 582 S.E.2d 156 (2003).
326. Answering a 911 call, with respect to a capsized fishing boat, county firefighters
were at the scene when plaintiffs husband arrived and swam out to the boat in search of
one of the fishermen. Upon reaching the boat, plaintiff's husband called for help, went
under, and drowned. One of the firefighters attempted to throw a fire hose to the husband
but was unable to reach him. Id. at 163-64, 582 S.E.2d at 156-57.
327. Id. at 165, 582 S.E.2d at 158. Plaintiff argued "that the fire vehicle should have
been equipped with a rope of sufficient length that it could have been used to rescue her
husband, and that the lack of such rope constituted negligent 'maintenance' of the vehicle
from which the wrongful death arose." Id.
328. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1996 & Supp. 2004).
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ing its coverage of the "ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of any
motor vehicle."3 To plaintiff's charge of negligent "maintenance," the
court was adamant: "The 'maintenance... of any motor vehicle'.., has
nothing to do with whether a rope or any other rescue equipment was
present on the fire vehicle."3 ° Minus insurance coverage, county
immunity prevailed.33'
Sovereign immunity does not protect the county against judicial
contempt, a precept epitomized in DeKalb County v. Adams, 332 which
concerned a settlement agreement between the county and its prison
inmates. 3' Entering the agreement into an order of March 2001, with
an eighteen-month expiration date, the trial court later, in November
2001, found the county in contempt. Arguing that the court's order had
expired after eighteen months in September 2002, the county maintained
that a subsequent enforcement order of November 2002 was ineffective. 33 In rejecting that position, the court of appeals refused to allow
the county to denigrate the contempt order by "run[ning] out the clock"
on the settlement agreement.3 5 That result, the court posited, "would
deprive the inmates, not the county, of the benefit of their bargain."3 6
Several liability claims of the period targeted county officers and
employees personally.337 Sued in their individual capacities, those

329.
330.

Robinson, 261 Ga. App. at 165, 582 S.E.2d at 158.
Id.
331. Id. "There was no waiver of immunity and [the] County was entitled to summary
judgment." Id.
332. 262 Ga. App. 243, 585 S.E.2d 178 (2003).
333. The agreement required the county to improve the medical care provided to the
jail inmates. Id. at 243, 585 S.E.2d at 179.
334. Id. at 244, 585 S.E.2d at 180. "Mhe county contended that because the settlement
agreement had expired on September 26, the court's power to coerce compliance with that
agreement also had expired." Id.
335. Id. at 246, 585 S.E.2d at 181.
336. Id.
Although, as the county argues, the parties negotiated a finite term for the
settlement agreement, they also contemplated that the county would comply with
the agreement during that term. But the county did not comply, and it cannot
now complain that the expiration of the term halts the court's lawful efforts to
coerce compliance, particularly when those efforts began long before the
agreement was due to expire.
Id.
337. For treatment of the personal liability of local government officers or employees,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13
GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local
Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993).
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defendants enjoy "official immunity" for "discretionary functions"
performed without malice or intent; only for "ministerial functions" can
they be held for negligence."' The distinction between "discretionary"
and "ministerial" functions dominated Harvey v. Nichols,339 a claim
against four county jail officials for a prison inmate's suicide.3 4 0 The
court viewed the duties of both the county sheriff and the jail manager
to be discretionary, actions made on examining facts, experience, and
best judgment, 341 and their conduct free from malice or actual intent
to injure. 342 Accordingly, they enjoyed official immunity from liability.
The two detention officers, however, followed established procedures,
executed specific duties, and thus functioned in a ministerial fashion.3"
Although they, therefore, enjoyed no official immunity, they
still managed to escape responsibility.3 " Their negligence, the court
asserted,
"was not the proximate cause of the [prisoner's] taking his own
3 45
life."

Middlebrooks v. Bibb County,3" another prisoner-suicide suit against
'
law enforcement officers, 17
yielded a similar exercise. After determining that none of the officers worked under clear, definite, and certain
policies, the court deemed them engaged in discretionary functions.m

338. Id.
339. 260 Ga. App. 187, 581 S.E.2d 272 (2003).
340. Decedent was arrested for murder, evaluated by prison officers, and placed in a
holding cell subject to monitoring. He was last checked on around 8 p.m. and found to have
hung himself around 9 p.m. Plaintiffs sued the county sheriff, the jail manager, and two
detention officers. Id. at 188-89, 581 S.E.2d at 275.
341. Each officer's actions, "made on the basis of his examination of the facts, his
experience, and the exercise of his best judgment, were discretionary." Id. at 192, 581
S.E.2d at 277.
342. "Nothing the [plaintiffs] charged either [officer] with doing or failing to do rises
to the level of actual malice or evidences an actual intent to harm." Id.
343. Their actions, "dictated as they were by established procedure and requiring
merely the execution of a specific duty, were ministerial in nature." Id. at 192-93, 581
S.E.2d at 277.
344. Id. at 194, 581 S.E.2d at 278.
345. Id. "inhere was no evidence that [decedent's] suicide was a probable consequence
of the detention officers' failure to monitor his cell ....
Nothing in the record before this
Court suggests that, if the surveillance protocol had been followed, [decedent] would not
have been able to take his own life." Id. at 193-94, 581 S.E.2d at 278. The court thus
affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for all defendants. Id. at 194, 581
S.E.2d at 278.
346. 261 Ga. App. 382, 582 S.E.2d 539 (2003).
347. Decedent, while under a suicide watch in a holding cell in the booking area,
asphyxiated himself by a self-applied tourniquet to his neck. He had spoken to an officer
around 2 a.m. and was found dead around 9 a.m. Id. at 383-84, 582 S.E.2d at 542.
348. Id. at 386, 582 S.E.2d at 543.
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Without evidence of conduct amounting to wilfulness or malice," 9 the
court determined they "are all entitled to official immunity as a matter
of law."35
Personal liability claims also impacted the scenario of the "emergency
chase collision." Two cases featured plaintiffs' collisions with fleeing
suspects, and each received the same disposition by the court of appeals.
In Smith v. Chatham County,"5 ' police pursued a fleeing truck into an
intersection where it struck plaintiffs' vehicle. 3" Affirming the officers'
official immunity, the court reasoned as follows: "Inasmuch as the
decision to engage in a pursuit clearly requires more than mere
execution of a relatively simple, specific duty, the officers were performing discretionary acts."5 " Additionally, there was no evidence of
"actual malice" or "actual intent to cause injury."3 " The plaintiff in
Standard v. Hobbs. sought to avoid a similar result with evidence
that the sheriff's department possessed "a written standard operating
procedure governing high speed pursuit."356 Following that procedure
constituted only a "ministerial duty," plaintiff maintained, for which the
defendant deputy enjoyed no official immunity.35 7 Rejecting plaintiff's
contention, the court characterized the written policy as providing
"guidelines and boundaries" requiring the officer "to weigh competing
factors." 3 " "This balancing process," the court declared, "is the

mhe evidence is uncontroverted that the employees of [the countyjaill were made
aware of the policy and received on-the-job training in what was a proper exercise
of their personal judgment in making case-by-case decisions on the type and
frequency of monitoring and what items should be left in an inmate's cell.
Id.
349. "In this case, there was no showing of any conduct by any of these defendants
which would amount to wilfulness, malice, or corruption." Id., 582 S.E.2d at 544.
350. Id.
351. 264 Ga. App. 566, 591 S.E.2d 388 (2003).
352. Id. at 566, 591 S.E.2d at 388. The officers sought to stop the truck in checking on
car break-ins and thefts at car dealerships in the area. Id.
353. Id. at 570, 591 S.E.2d at 391.
354. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
officers. Id.
355. 263 Ga. App. 873, 589 S.E.2d 634 (2003). Plaintiff was struck when emerging
from her private driveway by a vehicle being pursued by a deputy sheriff and driven by one
wanted for armed robberies who was deemed armed and dangerous. Id. at 873-75, 589
S.E.2d at 635-36.
356. Id. at 876, 589 S.E.2d at 637.
357. Id. at 876-77, 589 S.E.2d at 637. "The document cautions officers 'to avoid
contributing to the danger already created by the violating motorist,' not to duplicate a
fleeing suspect's unnecessary risks, and various other cautions, all of which [plaintiff]
claims were ministerial duties that [the officer] violated." Id.
358. Id. at 877, 589 S.E.2d at 637-38.
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hallmark of discretionary action."3 9 Again, the evidence suggested no
"malice or intent," and defendant "was entitled to official, or qualified,
"3 60

immunity.
Smith v. Bulloch County Board of Commissioners36 ' featured a
plaintiff struck not by a fleeing suspect but rather by the emergency
The
vehicle itself-a county ambulance answering a 911 call. 62
distinction counted for naught, however, despite county protocol
requiring the emergency response. That protocol, plaintiff argued,
rendered the response nondiscretionary and ministerial.3 63 Turning a
deaf ear to the effort, the court drew a finer focus: "Even if [defendant's]
choice to respond ...was limited, the process of driving the ambulance
Emergency response driving, the court
... was discretionary ... ." 3
delineated, "is not a 'relatively simple, specific duty.' The mechanical
application of certain traffic rules is suspended. Personal judgment is
involved in determining how best to proceed."3 6 The driver enjoyed
official immunity for his negligence6
Immunity likewise cloaked actions by police officers who, in Reed v.
DeKalb County,36 arrested a school superintendent for interfering with
the arrest of two students." 0 "ITihe decision to effectuate a warrantless arrest generally is a discretionary act requiring personal judgment
and deliberation on the part of the officer."369 In the absence of

359. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 638. "The written policy aids the officer in this process by
providing standards by which the officer should be guided in exercising his or her
discretion." Id.
360. Id. at 878, 589 S.E.2d at 638. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of
summary judgment for the officer. Id.
361. 261 Ga. App. 667, 583 S.E.2d 475 (2003).
362. The collision occurred on a public road with the ambulance striking plaintiffs car
on the driver's side as she was making a left turn. Id. at 668, 583 S.E.2d at 476.
363. Id. at 669, 583 S.E.2d at 477.
364. Id. "'Procedures or instructions adequate to cause an act to become ministerial
must be so clear, definite, and certain as merely to require the execution of a relatively
simple, specific duty.'" Id. (quoting Happoldt v. Kutscher, 256 Ga. App. 96, 98, 567 S.E.2d
380, 382 (2002)).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. 264 Ga. App. 83, 589 S.E.2d 584 (2003).
368. Id. at 84, 589 S.E.2d at 586. The officers who were called to the school on another
matter, encountered two students who had been fighting and decided to arrest them.
When the superintendent attempted to prevent the arrest, the officers arrested her also.
Later, the solicitor-general called the parties together and obtained a consent agreement.
Plaintiff sued the officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Id.
369. Id. at 86, 589 S.E.2d at 587. "Even when an arresting officer operates on a
mistaken belief that an arrest is appropriate, official immunity still applies." Id.
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"malice or intent to injure, no liability attaches to the officer's exercise
of his lawful discretion even when the decision to effectuate the arrest
is flawed."370
Contrarily, Meagher v. Quick3 7' illustrated "protocol" adequate to
convert police duties into a ministerial function. The procedure
appeared in a state statute requiring that upon investigating an incident
of family violence, the officer must prepare a written "Family Violence
Report." 72 Even though defendant officers concluded that no act of
violence had occurred,3 73 the court emphasized, they were "dispatched
in response to a report of child abuse."374 Under the statute the report
requirement attached at that juncture.3 75 "These acts as simple,
absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to
exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty, are
perform that duty precluded a
ministerial."375 The officers' failure 3to
77
summary judgement on their behalf.
I.

Zoning

The zoning controversy of Mid-Georgia Environmental Management
Group, L.L.L.P v. Meriwether County37 arose from an effort by plaintiff, a limited partnership, to build a landfill in an area not zoned for the

370. Id. at 87, 589 S.E.2d at 588. There was no malice, the court held, "[elven
assuming that their actions in arresting [plaintiff] may have been misguided .... " Id.
Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment for the officers. Id.
371. 264 Ga. App. 639, 594 S.E.2d 182 (2003).
372. Id. at 640, 594 S.E.2d at 184. The statute specifies thirteen items of information
the report must contain. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.1(c) (2004).
373. Meagher, 264 Ga. App. at 641, 594 S.E.2d at 184. The officers were dispatched
to the apartment upon a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a female child being whipped.
The officers entered the apartment, interviewed a female, talked with a male, cautioned
them that they could not spank the child to the point of leaving bruises, and concluded that
no child abuse had occurred. The officers departed the scene early in the afternoon, the
beating of the child then resumed, and the child was pronounced dead shortly prior to 5
p.m. Id.
374. Id. at 644, 594 S.E.2d at 186.
375. Id.
[W]henever an incident of possible family violence is investigated by police, a
written Family Violence Report is mandatory, whether founded or unfounded,
such report as inclusive of 13 subparts, a requirement which, in effect, sets out the
scope of the minimum essential investigation for family violence as required by
the General Assembly.
Id. at 643-44, 594 S.E.2d at 186.
376. Id. at 644, 594 S.E.2d at 186.
377. Id. "[Glenuine issues of material fact remain as to whether their failure to [report]
proximately resulted in the child's injuries and death." Id.
378. 277 Ga. 670, 594 S.E.2d 344 (2004).
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purpose. Asserting the county's failure to comply with the Zoning
Procedures Law,37 9 plaintiff challenged the county's ordinance and
sought to mandamus issuance of a verification letter." ° The supreme
court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the writ and canvassed
plaintiff's enumerated flaws in the county zoning ordinance. 381 First,
the court held the record complete in demonstrating county compliance
with the notice and hearing requirements of the Zoning Procedures
Law. 82 Second, the court concluded there was no merit in plaintiff's
objection that the county kept no copy of suspended portions of the
ordinance."M "There is nothing... in the Zoning Procedures Law...
that conditions validity of a zoning ordinance on the retention of
Finally, the court denied
superseded portions of the ordinance."3
plaintiff's challenge that the ordinance failed to incorporate an official
Indeed, "the County's zoning ordinance expressly
zoning map. 3"
incorporated the official zoning map by reference," the court retorted,
and the commissioners had that map before them when they considered
Accordingly, "the County has a valid zoning ordithe ordinance. 86
nance that prohibits the building of a landfill on the proposed site....

379. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -6 (2000).
380. Mid-Georgia,277 Ga. at 670, 594 S.E.2d at 346. Plaintifi's position was that "the
County's zoning ordinance had not been validly adopted and therefore the County's only
option was to issue the verification letter." Id.
381. Id. at 675, 594 S.E.2d at 348. Said the court: "Mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy." Id. at 672, 594 S.E.2d at 347. For emphasis of that point and an account of the
writ's enormous role in local government litigation, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1985).
382. Mid-Georgia, 277 Ga. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 347. The court emphasized that the
record included certified minutes showing public meetings and noticed public hearings on
the adoption of the ordinance and its subsequent amendments. Id.
383. Id. at 674, 594 S.E.2d at 348.
384. Id. (emphasis in original).
385. Id. at 675, 594 S.E.2d at 348.
386. Id.
387. Id. Justice Hines dissented on a procedural ground. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 349 (Hines,
J., dissenting). Although not involving a local government, Sweeney v. Landings Ass'n, 277
Ga. 761, 595 S.E.2d 74 (2004), involved the validity of restrictive covenants imposed upon
property owners in one of the county's gated subdivisions. Rejecting complainant's
argument that under a general statute the covenants expired after twenty years, the
supreme court reasoned as follows: "Neither that statute [(O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60(b))]
nor any other law limits the enforceability of covenants to only a single 20-year term or
precludes their eventual renewal upon the expiration of that period." Id. at 761-62, 595
S.E.2d at 74 (citation omitted). Under express provisions of these covenants, said the
court, they "renew automatically at successive 10-year intervals unless two-thirds of the
residents objected." Id. Accordingly, originally effective in 1972, the covenants had
"renewed automatically in 1992 and again in 2002," and sufficiently authorized the
subdivision to impose prescribed sanctions for complainant's violation of a dog-restraint
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LEGISLATION

The 2004 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly witnessed
hard-fought turf battles between municipal and county interests.
Perhaps the most direct outgrowth of those conflicts, a mammoth
legislative enactment, seeks to re-order important facets of municipal
annexation and of the county Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax
("SPLOSr).3
The annexation revisions establish a uniform procedure via which
counties may challenge or seek to mitigate land use decisions made by
municipalities upon annexation. 9 The county may employ a dispute
resolution procedure consisting, inter alia, of municipal zoning notice,
county notice of intention to raise objections and written documentation,
An unproductive
and a period for developing mitigating measures.'
period of mitigation allows the city or county to request appointment of
a mediator whose failure to resolve the matter permits the county to
request review by a citizen review panel. 9 1 The panel is appointed
and then informed of the issues by the mediator, after which the panel
may render a decision not binding on the city.39 The entire dispute
resolution procedure is to take no more than approximately five
months. 3" Finally, a municipality attempting to annex property by
local statute of the Georgia General Assembly must notify the county of
its efforts.3 94
The SPLOST revisions retain complete discretion in the county as to
calling a tax referendum, with the cities possessing neither the authority
to initiate discussion on the inclusion of municipal projects nor the power
to veto county proposals.395 A county may develop projects for a
SPLOST proposal by two procedures. First, the county may enter an
intergovernmental agreement with cities representing fifty percent or
more of the municipal population, under which agreement the tax can
be collected for up to six years even if the estimated tax amounts are

measure. Id. For perspective on covenants in the context of local government law, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Restrictive Covenants and Zoning: A Dynamic Duo, URBAN GA. MAG. 16

(Sept. 1980).
388. Ga. H.R. Bill 709, Reg. Sess. (2003).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id&
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sooner collected. 3" If the county and cities cannot reach an intergovernmental agreement, the county may expend all or part of the tax
proceeds on specified "level-one" facilities or may reserve up to twenty
percent of the tax revenues for described "level-two" projects.397
Remaining tax proceeds are distributed to the county and cities
according to population. 98 In the absence of an intergovernmental
agreement and with specified exceptions, the tax cannot be collected
beyond five years or when the estimated revenues are collected.'"
Counties and cities receiving SPLOST revenues must issue an annual
report showing estimated costs, amounts expended, and a statement of
surplus funds for capital projects.4
A clarifying statute provides that sheriffs, clerks of court, probate
judges, and tax commissioners are not included in county-municipal
deliberations for formulating county service delivery strategies. 40 The
statute also raises the threshold for requiring annual audits to an
annual budget of $300,000. 4 2
Various immunities and exceptions for local governments emerged
from the session. Included is a measure immunizing a local governing
authority from consequences of a decision to close a railroad crossing.40 3 The local government is declared free of liability for injuries or
Another
damages arising from the existence or use of the crossing."
measure excepts from the open records mandate, information from
athletic or recreational programs of a public agency. 5 Those records
may not identify children twelve years old or under."
Local governments gained a number of regulatory powers under newly
For example, a local governing authority is
enacted provisions.
empowered to set conditions under which specified motorized carts may
be operated upon its streets, including conditions of operating the cart
A local governing authority may desigwithout a driver's license.4
nate intersections on streets under its control that may be crossed by the

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ga.
Id.
Ga.
Id.
Ga.
Id.
Ga.

H.R. Bill 666, Reg. Sess. (2004).
H.R. Bill 1254, Reg. Sess. (2004).
H.R. Bill 1358, Reg. Sess. (2004).
H.R. Bill 1063, Reg. Sess. (2004).
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motorized carts.40 8 Second, local governments gained enforcement
tools for creating a system to track and require the proper disposal of
commercial grease, as well as the power to permit haulers and fine
Finally, local governments may report to a newly-created
violators.'
review board any misappropriations of hotel/motel tax revenues
identified by the state auditor.410 Upon the review board's finding of
noncompliance, and no remedial action, the State Revenue Department
may terminate the tax.41'
Local governments likewise encountered additional duties from
legislation of the period. Cities and counties that require building and
construction permits must provide applicants with a method by which
412
they can obtain and pay for the permit by mail or electronic means.
Second, municipal solid waste disposal permits may not be issued for
4 13
landfills within one mile from specified private recreational camps.
Third, local public safety and emergency response organizations must
system to be created by the
establish a new unified incident command
414
State Emergency Management Agency.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The local government's "obligation to sue" and its attractiveness as the
object of suit, operated to perfection during the survey period. "Regardless of the law," those factors perpetuate both the fable and the fabric of
local government jurisprudence.

408. Id.
409. Ga. S. Bill 568, Reg. Sess. (2004).
410. Ga. H. R. Bill 1415, Reg. Sess. (2004).
411. Id.
412. Ga. H.R. Bill 1598, Reg. Sess. (2004).
413. Ga. H.R. Bill 1083, Reg. Sess. (2004).
414. Ga. S. Bill 243, Reg. Sess (2004). Ga H.R. Bill 1474, Reg. Sess. (2004) established
a House study committee to investigate the state's trauma care system. Given Georgians'
special susceptibility to death by trauma, and the decrease in hospital trauma centers in
recent years, the resolution seeks information for improvement.

